Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence by Birnbaum, Sheila L.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 3 Issue 3 - Symposium: In Honor of Dean 
John W. Wade: Current Developments in the 
Law of Torts 
Article 3 
4-1980 
Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to 
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence 
Sheila L. Birnbaum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict 
Liability to Negligence, 33 Vanderbilt Law Review 593 (1980) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol33/iss3/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Unmasking the Test for Design
Defect: From Negligence [to




The doctrine of strict products liability is grounded in social
and economic policy considerations that were inadequately served
under traditional negligence and warranty concepts.' In 1916, in
the watershed decision of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,2 Judge
Cardozo announced the philosophical point of departure out of
which products liability law was to emerge:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.
Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the
element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used
by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is
under a duty to make it carefully. . . . We have put aside the notion
that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of neg-
ligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We
have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put
its source in the law.
3
With one deft stroke, Judge Cardozo tore down the privity barrier
to recovery in a negligence action. The MacPherson decision, how-
ever, did a great deal more than simply remove a legal technicality.
Judge Cardozo focused the inquiry on what is the wellspring of all
tort law-defining the nature and extent of the duty owed.
4
The privity doctrine dictated that the manufacturer's duty ex-
tended only to the immediate purchaser.5 As one could see even as
* Professor of Law, New York University Law School; A.B., 1960, M.A., 1962, Hunter
College; J.D., 1965, New York University. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable
assistance of Barbara Wrubel of Fordham University School of Law.
1. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960).
2. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. Id. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053.
4. At the very outset of the decision, Judge Cardozo concisely stated the issue: "The
question to be determined is whether the defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to any
one but the immediate purchaser." Id. at 385, 111 N.E. at 1051.
5. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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early as 1916, however, the developing industrial and technological
revolution necessarily distanced the manufacturer from the con-
sumer, placing various intermediaries in the chain of distribution
between them. In MacPherson, for example, the defendant manu-
facturer had sold an automobile to a dealer, who in turn sold it to
plaintiff, whose wife was injured when one of the wheels, made of
defective wood, crumbled into fragments, causing the vehicle to
collapse.' Linking the duty of due care to the contract doctrine of
privity made the responsibility of the manufacturer to the user of
the product essentially illusory. As Judge Cardozo observed,
The dealer was indeed the one person-of whom it might be said with
some approach to certainty that by him the car would not be used. Yet
the defendant would have us say that he was the one person whom it
was under a legal duty to protect. The law does not lead us to so incon-
sequent a conclusion.
7
Indeed, Judge Cardozo refused to allow the intricacies of contract
law to abrogate the manufacturer's duty of care. When the societal
goal of holding a manufacturer accountable for the safety of his
products was threatened by the interposition of a technical rule of
law, it was the rule that had to give way. Thus, in MacPherson
Judge Cardozo affirmed the overriding societal imperative that
manufacturers be held to owe a duty of due care directly to users of
their products.
It was to take almost half a century, however, for the privity
barrier to be completely eliminated from products liability litiga-
tion. An injured plaintiff, in order to avoid the substantial burden
of proving negligence, often relied on warranty concepts to estab-
lish that a product was not of merchantable quality. The doctrine
of implied warranty provided a distinctly advantageous approach
for a plaintiff, since it was essentially a strict liability concept.' An
injured plaintiff, however, even after MacPherson, could not re-
cover for breach of warranty unless he was in contractual privity
with the seller.' Although the social policy considerations favoring
6. 217 N.Y. at 384-85, 111 N.E. at 1051.
7. Id. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053.
8. Implied warranty may be viewed as strict liability in the sense that the plaintiff need
not prove that a seller was negligent in the manufacture or sale of the product in order to
state a cause of action. Plaintiff need only prove that the product was of unmerchantable
quality-i.e., not fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was sold. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978
version). See also J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-6 (1972).
9. There were notable exceptions to the privity requirement. For example, courts elimi-
nated the privity requirement in cases involving adulterated food and drink, thereby giving
rise to a notion of "implied" strict liability. "[T]he warranty to the consumer was not the
one made on the original sale to the dealer, and did not run with the goods, but was a new
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elimination of privity were clearly established by MacPherson and
its progeny, the fact that warranty concepts were grounded in con-
tract law inhibited any parallel liberalization of the privity require-
ment in a cause of action based on a claim of unmerchantability.
Finally, in 1960, in the leading case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,"' the New Jersey Supreme Court dispensed with the
privity requirement in an action based on breach of implied war-
ranty, holding that the obligation of the manufacturer is not
grounded in the law of sales, but upon the "demands of social jus-
tice."' The court found that under modern marketing conditions
products carry an implied warranty of reasonable suitability, which
accompanies the product into the hands of the ultimate
consumer.'
2
The fall of what Dean Prosser has called "the citadel of priv-
ity, ' " 3 certainly eased the way for the injured consumer to bring a
cause of action against the manufacturer of a defective product.
Still, many difficult hurdles remained for the plaintiff. If the suit
was based on a warranty claim, courts required strict compliance
with the technicalities of sales law. Thus, for example, proper no-
tice had to be given by an injured consumer within a reasonable
time after breach of the warranty as a prerequisite to maintaining
a claim." All too often, the untutored consumer would find himself
barred from bringing the action in warranty for failure to satisfy
the stringent requirements imposed by the Uniform Sales Act, or
later, the Uniform Commercial Code.
Similarly, a cause of action in negligence did not suddenly be-
come a route without burdens simply by the abandonment of the
privity requirement. The injured plaintiff still had the considerable
evidentiary problem of proving that the manufacturer was, in fact,
negligent. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where applicable, of-
fered some help, but the manufacturer could dispel the inference of
negligence by advancing sufficient evidence to show that he exer-
cised due care in the manufacture of the product and in the adop-
tion of quality control measures. As Judge Traynor noted, "[a]n
and independent one made directly to the consumer; and. . . it did not arise out of or depend
upon any contract, but was imposed by law in tort, as a matter of policy." W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 97, at 654 (4th ed. 1971).
10. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
11. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 83 (quoting Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P.
633 (1913)).
12. 32 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
13. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791 (1966).
14. See U.C.C. § 2-607.
1980]
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injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a position to refute
such evidence or identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly
be familiar with the manufacturing process as the manufacturer
himself is.5"
Clearly, traditional negligence and warranty causes of action
posed serious impediments to the injured consumer's ability to re-
cover. Perhaps more importantly, the public policy goals under-
girding the societal commitment to a notion of expansive manufac-
turer liability for defective products could not be effectively
realized in view of the limitations inherent in the traditional causes
of action.
By the 1950s and early 1960s, it was becoming increasingly
clear that considerations of public policy would yield a sufficient
rationale for adopting a strict liability cause of action for claims
based on defective products."6 Holding a manufacturer liable for
product-related injuries without a showing of negligence can rea-
sonably be justified on two grounds, both of which may be deemed
socially valuable. First, since manufacturers are in the best posi-
tion to control and eliminate the risks posed by defective products
that might roll off the assembly line, it does not seem unreasonable
or unfair to impose on them an economic incentive to develop the
most effective quality control systems attainable." Any departure
from best efforts in this area can justifiably be made extremely
costly for the manufacturer. Second, even when an occasional de-
fect does slip through, the burden of a resulting injury can be
shouldered better by the manufacturer than by the consumer.
While it would be irrational to say that society expects defect-free
production runs, it is not unreasonable to require that the manu-
facturer foot the bill for injuries that result when an inadvertently
defective product causes harm, notwithstanding his due care ef-
forts. The manufacturer can spread the risk through insurance and
price adjustments, whereas the injured individual might suffer a
crushing financial blow underwriting the loss himself.18
15. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
16. See James, Products Liability, 34 Tax. L. REv. 192 (1955); Noel, Manufacturers of
Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. Rav. 963 (1957); Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 1; Roberts, Implied Warranties-The Privity Rule and
Strict Liability-The Non-Food Cases, 27 Mo. L. Rav. 194 (1962); Wilson, Products Liability,
43 CALIF. L. REv. 614 (1955).
17. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 503-04, 525 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1974)
("We suspect that, in the final analysis, the imposition of liability has a beneficial effect on
manufacturers of defective products both in the care they take and the warning they give.").
18. Most courts tend to pay rather uncritical judicial lip service to one or more varia-
tions of the safety-incentive/risk-spreading rationales justifying the imposition of strict liabil-
[Vol. 33:593
TEST FOR DESIGN DEFECT
In 1963, in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.," the California Supreme Court relied on this dual
rationale in adopting a strict liability in tort cause of action, inde-
pendent of both negligence and warranty. Sweeping away all the
warranty obstacles theretofore facing injured users and consumers,
the court simply and succinctly held: "[a] manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that
it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being."2
Courts and commentators after Greenman have recognized
that the central issue in a strict products liability action is the defi-
nition to be given to the term "defect," which is the very essence of
strict liability. Courts could certainly look to the policy rationale
underlying Greenman as a sufficient basis upon which to establish
a cause of action grounded in strict products liability: "[t]he pur-
pose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves." 2' Neither this reasoning,
however, nor the holding in Greenman provided any external stan-
dard or criteria for making the initial determination that a particu-
lar product is, in fact, defective. As Professor Twerski has noted:
"[i]t may now be true that defect, like obscenity in Justice Stew-
art's definition, will be discovered by sense impression. Unfortu-
nately, 'I know it when I see it' will not suffice as a judicial stan-
ity. This general agreement about the policies underlying strict liability, however, should not
belie the enormous complexity of the economic and jurisprudential issues involved. An exami-
nation of some of the more searching analyses by leading commentators raises significant
doubts about the utility and basic validity of these rationales as a foundation for a doctrine
of what has been called "social engineering." See generally Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence
and Accidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the
Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L. REv. 643 (1978); Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liabil-
ity: Is There a Better Approach? 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 109 (1976); Kalven, Torts: The Quest for
Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 189 (1965); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability
Theory of Torts, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976); Lang, Compensation of Victims-A Pious
and Misleading Platitude, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1559 (1966); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections
on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L.
REV. 803 (1976); Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in
Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957); Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973); Prosser, supra note 1; Raleigh, The "State of the Art"
in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old "Defense," 4 OHmO N.L. REV. 249 (1977); Sachs,
Negligence or Strict Product Liability: Is There Really a Difference in Law or Economics? 8
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 259 (1978); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability forProducts,
44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 809 (1955).
19. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
20. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
21. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
1980]
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dard for products liability." 2
When the final version of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts was published two years after Greenman, the
drafters sought to put a substantive gloss on the term defect. Sec-
tion 402A provided that sellers of products "in a defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous" are strictly liable for harm caused to
the ultimate consumer or user.2 As comment i made clear, the ad-
dition of the term "unreasonably dangerous" was intended to qual-
ify the notion of defect and to preclude the possibility that manu-
facturers would be held liable for any and all injuries caused by the
use or consumption of their products.24 There probably is no abso-
lutely safe product; all products have inherent potential to cause
harm if overused or misused. Even a seemingly innocuous product
like butter has the inherent danger of depositing cholesterol in the
arteries, which leads to heart attacks; but this does not make but-
ter unreasonably dangerous. "Many products cannot possibly be
made entirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug neces-
sarily involves some risk of harm, if only from overconsumption.",
Butter that is contaminated with poisonous fish oil would, how-
ever, in the language of section 402A, be considered to be in a de-
22. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product
Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 304-05 (1977)(referring to Justice Stewart's con-
currence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)).
23. When § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was drafted in 1965, it suggested
the following formulation as a basis for strict products liability:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller. (Emphasis added).
Comment g to § 402A explains and qualifies the application of strict products liability:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves
the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the product
in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the
time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition
at the time it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and
unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then
defective, the burden is not sustained.
24. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23
(1966).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965).
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fective condition unreasonably dangerous."
Greenman cleared the way and set the groundwork for creating
an independent cause of action in strict products liability, but
courts have traditionally looked to section 402A for guidance in im-
posing liability on sellers of defective products. Much of the confu-
sion that continues to plague courts in applying the doctrine of
strict products liability can be traced to this dual legacy of Green-
man on the one hand, with its singularly bald notion of product
defect, and section 402A on the other, with its amorphous terminol-
ogy, "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."
The problems of defining defect are further complicated be-
cause the same linguistic formulation is used to describe two en-
tirely distinct factual clusters. The term defect is used to apply to
product flaws that result from unintentional mishaps in manufac-
turing as well as to flaws that arise from intentional design deci-
sions." In the case of a manufacturing defect, the meaning of de-
fect creates no difficulty:2 the product at issue may be evaluated
against the manufacturer's own production standards, as mani-
fested by other like products that roll off the assembly line.29 Con-
scious design defect cases,3" however, provide no such simple test.
26. Id.
27. Analytically, it is essential to distinguish unintended manufacturing defects,
wherein the court has at hand a built-in and dispositive test for determining whether a
defect exists, from design defects, wherein the very question of whether a defect in fact
exists is central to the court's inquiry. It is only in design defect cases that the court is called
upon to supply the standard for defectiveness.
28. Not all courts would agree. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d
1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), the California Supreme Court was reluctant to distinguish
between manufacturing and design defects for the purpose of imposing liability based on
different standards.
The most obvious problem we perceive in creating any such distinction is that thereafter
it would be advantageous to characterize a defect in one rather than the other category.
It is difficult to prove that a product ultimately caused injury because a widget was
poorly welded-a defect in manufacture-rather than because it was made of inexpen-
sive metal difficult to weld, chosen by a designer concerned with economy-a defect in
design.
Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
29. Traynor calls this the "deviation-from-the-norm test." Traynor, The Ways and
Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rav. 363, 367 (1965).
30. Professor Henderson has pointed out that a distinction should be drawn between
inadvertent design errors and conscious design choices.
At one end of the spectrum are risks of harm which originate in the inadvertent failure
of the design engineer to appreciate adequately the implications of the various elements
of his design, or to employ commonly understood and universally accepted engineering
techniques to achieve the ends intended with regard to the product.
Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1548 (1973). As in cases involving manufacturing flaws,
the court need not develop its own legal standards of defectiveness for cases involving inad-
vertent design error, since recourse can readily be had to established extrajudicial, engineer-
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Plaintiff is attacking the intended design itself, arguing that the
design created unreasonable risks of harm. In attacking the prod-
uct's design, the plaintiff is not impugning the manufacturer's
product as much as the manufacturer's choice of design. The use of
the term "defective condition unreasonably dangerous," therefore,
creates serious analytic problems.
In adjusting to a theory of liability and recovery based on de-
fect rather than fault," courts have made the uneasy journey from
negligence to warranty to strict products liability without fashion-
ing a uniform set of definitions and rules that can be relied on with
any consistency by consumers and users of products as injured
plaintiffs, by manufacturers and retailers as besieged defendants,
and by lay jurors as arbiters of the conflict. The problem inheres
not so much in the conceptual subtleties of the notion of strict lia-
bility, as it does in creating a uniform approach to the issue of de-
fectiveness that will rationally accommodate the interests of both
injured consumers and product sellers.
On the one hand, courts have accepted the social policy ratio-
nale that those injured by defective products should be compen-
sated for their injuries without being subject to the contractual in-
tricacies of the law of sales and without having to face the onerous
evidentiary burdens inherent in negligence cases. On the other
hand, even though courts agree that manufacturers can most effec-
tively distribute the costs of injuries, they recoil at the prospect of
making sellers insurers of their products and thus absolutely lia-
ble32 for any and all injuries sustained from the use of those
ing safety standards. Id. at 1550-51. "At the other end of the spectrum are risks of harm which
originate in the conscious decision of the design engineer to accept the risks associated with
the intended design in exchange for increased benefits or reduced costs which the designer
believes justify conscious acceptance of the risks." Id. at 1548. It is in this area of conscious
design choices that courts have been called upon to develop and apply legal standards of
defectiveness for the purpose of imposing liability on manufacturers of unsafe products that
cause injury.
1 31. Dean Keeton has noted, "[t]he change in the substantive law as regards the liabil-
ity of makers of products and other sellers in the marketing chain has been from fault to
defect. The plaintiff is no longer required to impugn the maker, but he is required to impugn
the product." Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 33
(1973).
32. From the time of its early application, strict products liability has been viewed as
a tort doctrine, which the courts urge should not be confused with the imposition of absolute
liability.
Some quibbler may allege that this is liability without fault. It is not. . . .A plaintiff
relying upon the rule must prove a defect attributable to the manufacturer and causal
connection between that defect and the injury or damage of which he complains. When
able to do that, then and only then may he recover against the manufacturer of the
defective product.
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 98-99, 133 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1965). See also
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 459-60, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
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products.
Underlying the whole body of tort law is an awareness that the need for
compensation, alone, is not a sufficient basis for an award. . . . An
award is not to be made unless there exists some reason other than the
mere need of the victim for compensation. Otherwise, the award will be
an arbitrary shifting of loss from one person to another at a net loss to
society due to the economic and sociological costs of adjudication.
3
The courts, in attempting to avoid both the notion of fault im-
plicit in negligence and the harshness of no-fault implicit in abso-
lute liability, have focused the jury's attention on the condition of
the product rather than on the manufacturer's conduct. By so do-
ing, some courts have engaged in semantic gymnastics that confuse
juries, who must ultimately apply understandable guidelines if
they are justly to adjudicate the rights and duties of all parties.
Other courts have attempted to remove the critical issue of defec-
tiveness from the jury's consideration altogether, thus allowing the
court to make the ultimate determination of whether to shift the
loss from the injured plaintiff to the manufacturer. In all, after
fifteen years of decisionmaking in the products liability area, courts
have not only failed to fashion a legally sound definition of defect
in design cases but have also failed in practice to separate concep-
tually the notions of strict liability, negligence, warranty, and abso-
lute liability.
The California Supreme Court, in the recent decision of Barker
v. Lull Engineering Co.,"' has reexamined the concept of defect in
design defect cases and, in so doing, has further confused the de-
lineation between strict liability and negligence concepts. Since
California has long been an innovator in products liability law, the
holding of the court has, and will continue to have, a substantial
impact on how other courts approach the problem of defining
defect.
Since the Barker decision was reported in January 1978, seven-
teen state supreme courts and at least as many state and federal
appellate courts have already been called upon to reconsider the
interpretation to be given the terminology "defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous." Generally, courts have declined to follow
California's lead.35 Nevertheless, it is revealing to examine the ra-
tionale courts have offered for either expressly refusing to follow
Barker or for impliedly doing so by reaffirming or redefining their
33. P. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM, 242 (1965).
34. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
35. At this writing, only the Supreme Court of Alaska, in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.
Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), has expressly adopted the two-pronged Barker test for
product defect.
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own brand of defect test. A brief critical analysis of Barker and a
survey of the decisions that have been reported in its wake expose
some of the more troubling issues that arise in strict products lia-
bility design cases, which still must be addressed.
This Article will consider the problems engendered by impre-
cise judicial analysis of the notion of design defect. The central is-
sues informing this investigation are as follows: (1) Can the notion
of manufacturer fault or negligence be rationally eliminated in a
design defect case? and (2) Should the term "unreasonably danger-
ous" be retained in the definition of defect in a design case, and if
so, how should it be defined?
II. THE Barker TEST
The plaintiff in Barker was injured while operating a high-lift
loader at a construction site. He contended that the loader was de-
fective as designed for want of outriggers, a roll bar, and seat
belts. 6 The defendant denied the loader was defective and ascribed
the accident to the plaintiff's inexperience and lack of skill37 in op-
erating the machine or to the misuse of the loader.38 There was
sharply conflicting expert testimony on the issue of design defect.
The'jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff ap-
pealed on the ground that the trial court erroneously charged the
jury by instructing it "that strict liability for a defect in design of a
product is based on a finding that the product was unreasonably
dangerous for its intended use."39
The Supreme Court of California agreed with the plaintiff and
seized this opportunity to deal with some of the serious confusion
that had been created by the court's earlier holding in Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp.4" In Cronin, the court rejected the "unreasona-
bly dangerous" terminology advanced in section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, but failed to provide any substantive
definition for the term. The court's primary motivation for re-
jecting "unreasonably dangerous" was that it "burdened the in-
jured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of negli-
36. 20 Cal. 3d at 419-21, 573 P.2d at 447-48, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229-30.
37. On the day of the accident, the regular operator of the loader failed to appear for
work and the plaintiff was assigned to fill in for him. Barker had received only limited
instruction in the operation of the loader and had operated it on only a few occasions prior
to the accident. Id. at 419, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
38. Defendant's expert claimed that at the time of the accident the loader was being
used on steep terrain for which the equipment was unsuited. Id. at 421, 573 P.2d at 448, 143
Cal. Rptr. at 230.
39. Id. at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
40. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
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gence. . . . Yet the very purpose of our pioneering efforts in this
field was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in
pursuing negligence.
41
Simply as a linguistic matter, however, the term "defect" has
implicit within it the notion of comparison-something can be de-
fective only if viewed against something else, which embodies a
standard for evaluation. By eliminating "unreasonably dangerous"
and providing no substitute concept, the California Supreme Court
essentially left the term "defect" without any substantive con-
tent.4" Not surprisingly, the Cronin decision caused considerable
confusion in California's intermediate courts. Analysis of post-
Cronin lower court decisions shows, ironically enough, a return to
the familiar terminology of negligence."
Against this backdrop, the Barker court attempted to reverse
the post-Cronin trend, clarify the meaning of defect, and define a
test for the jury to apply specifically in design defect cases. Reaf-
firming its "continued adherence to the principle that, in a product
liability action, the trier of fact must focus on the product, not on
the manufacturer's conduct, and that the plaintiff need not prove
that the manufacturer acted unreasonably or negligently in order
to prevail,"4 the court proposed the following dual-standard test:
41. Id. at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
42. See Keeton, supra note 31, at 32; Twerski, supra note 22, at 304-05.
43. In Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973),
the court noted, "[s]ince the issue is whether [the defendant] designed and put into circula-
tion a product unreasonably dangerous for use and since the unreasonableness of the danger
must be determined by the potential available to the designer at the time of design, it is
apparent that the strict liability and negligence claims merge." Id. at 640, 105 Cal. Rptr. at
895. In Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1973), the court brought a negligence test of foreseeability to bear in imposing strict liability
on a car manufacturer. The case turned on this observation by the court: "[p]laintiff may
or may not have turned 18 degrees, but her act in turning the wheel sharply to avoid a perilous
situation was not an uncommon occurrence and the jury could certainly have determined that
it was a foreseeable factor the VW designers should have considered in designing the car."
Id. at 518, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 115. In Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1974), the court followed Cronin and avoided using the term "unreasonably dan-
gerous." In its stead, the court posed a standard of "excessive preventable danger." The trier
of fact was asked to consider the manufacturer's reasonableness in taking precautions to
prevent such'excessive preventable danger. "[The manufacturer] is required to design his
vehicle to minimize unreasonable risks of injury and death." Id. at 6-7, 116 Cal. Rptr. at
578-79 (1974). Finally, in Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (1976), the court reviewed prior decisions but because it could find no comprehen-
sive test for defectiveness, it gleaned what it could from the earlier cases and set forth the
following: "any product so designed that it causes injury when used or misused in a foresee-
able fashion is defective if the design features which caused the injury created a danger
which was readily preventable through the employment of existing technology at a cost
consonant with the economical use of the product." Id. at 547, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
44. 20 Cal. 3d at 418, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
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[I]n design defect cases, a court may properly instruct a jury that a
product is defective in design if (1) the.plaintiff proves that the product
failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) the plain-
tiff proves that the product's design proximately caused injury and the
defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance
the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inher-
ent in such design.45
The first prong of the dual standard is drawn from the con-
sumer expectations test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec-
tion 402A, which is based on a warranty of fitness and merchanta-
bility approach to liability for defective products. Although the
court claimed to reject use of the term "unreasonably dangerous,"
its test is taken from comment i of section 402A, which is the very
comment that defines unreasonably dangerous:
Comment i: Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section
applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. . . The article sold
must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."
For the Barker court, however, the consumer expectations test
provides only a threshold for analysis. If a plaintiff proves that a
product fails to satisfy ordinary consumer expectations, he need go
no further-the product is defective and the defendant will be held
strictly liable for resulting injuries.47 Should a plaintiff fail to sat-
isfy this test, however, the inquiry is far from over. Taking into
consideration Dean Wade's criticism of the consumer expectations
test that "[iun many situations . . . the consumer would not know
what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the prod-
uct could be made,"48 the court reasoned that consumer expecta-
tions provide only a minimum standard below which no product
should fall.' Because of the technological complexity of many
products, consumers are often ill-equipped to formulate reasoned
expectations about safety. To allow a manufacturer to escape lia-
bility simply because the consumer does not know what to expect
would severely undermine the very reason for imposing strict liabil-
ity in the first place.5"
The Barker court also recognized that a manufacturer should
not be able to escape liability through the consumer expectations
45. Id. at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (emphasis omitted).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment i (1965).
47. 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
48. Wade, supra note 18.
49. 20 Cal. 3d at 425-26 n.7, 573 P.2d at 451'n.7, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7.
50. See text agcompanying note 21 supra.
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test simply because users take a dim view of the product's poten-
tial safety.
In Cronin. .. we flatly rejected the suggestion that recovery in a prod-
ucts liability action should be permitted only if a product is more dan-
gerous than contemplated by the average consumer, refusing to permit
the low esteem in which the public might hold a dangerous product to
diminish the manufacturer's responsibility for injuries caused by that
product."
If the plaintiff fails to convince the trier of fact that the prod-
uct did not meet ordinary consumer expectations, the second
prong, or risk-utility analysis," comes into play. Some of the rele-
vant factors a jury may consider in determining whether, under the
Barker test, the benefits of the design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in the design include "the gravity of the danger posed by
the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur,
the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the
financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences
to the product and to the consumer that would result from an al-
ternative design."53
To be sure, risk-utility analysis is not a novel approach in
strict products liability cases. In fact, the vast majority of courts
have for some time employed balancing tests in one form or an-
other." What makes the Barker test innovative is the shifting of
the burden of proof to the defendant.5 Among the most compelling
policy reasons behind the development of the doctrine of strict
products liability was the goal of relieving the injured plaintiff from
the "onerous evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of
action." Thus, under Barker, once the plaintiff makes a prima fa-
cie showing that the injury was proximately caused by the prod-
uct's design, the defendant rather than the plaintiff must prove, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that in light of the relevant fac-
51. 20 Cal. 3d at 425, 573 P.2d at 451, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 (emphasis in original).
52. It must be emphasized that the risk-utility balancing analysis urged by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court is not the traditional risk-utility test of negligence. The distinction in
approach turns on the fact that in strict liability the focus of the balancing analysis is on the
condition of the product, not on the conduct of the manufacturer, which would be the tradi-
tional negligence approach. See text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
53. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
54. See, e.g., Schell v. AMF, Inc., 567 F.2d 1259 (3rd Cir. 1977); Dorsey v. Yoder Co.,
331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Yoder Co. v. General Copper and Brass
Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3rd Cir. 1973); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976);
Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Cepeda v. Cumberland
Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485,
525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774
(1975).
55. The court makes clear that "the defendant's burden is one affecting the burden of
proof, rather than simply the burden of producing evidence." 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at
455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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tors his product is not defective.57 The California Supreme Court's
decision to shift the burden of proof was also prompted by its rec-
ognition that the technical matters involved in the question of the
adequacy of a particular design are "peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the manufacturer."58
The court emphatically reiterated that the risk-utility balanc-
ing test it proposed is not a test that "rings of negligence.",
[W]e believe that the test for defective design set out above is appropri-
ate in light of the rationale and limits of the strict liability doctrine, for
it subjects a manufacturer to liability whenever there is something"wrong" with the product's design-either because the product fails to
meet ordinary consumer expectations as to safety or because, on bal-
ance, the design is not as safe as it should be-while stopping short of
making the manufacturer an insurer for all injuries which may result
from the use of its product. This test, moreover, explicity focuses the
trier of fact's attention on the adequacy of the product itself, rather
than on the manufacturer's conduct, and places the burden on the man-
ufacturer, rather than the plaintiff, to establish that because of the
complexity of, and trade-offs implicit in, the design process, an injury-
producing product should nevertheless not be found defective.'
Thus, the Cronin mandate to eliminate the term "unreasona-
bly dangerous" is followed in Barker. The question remains, how-
ever, as to whether the dual-standard test, as a practical matter,
eliminates the "ring of negligence" and significantly alters the evi-
dentiary burdens in a strict products liability action. Conceptually,
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant undoubtedly lessens
the plaintiff's burden; but pragmatically, this is not as dramatic a
benefit as it might seem at first blush. In practice, defendants have
typically come foward with sufficient evidence of complicated tech-
nological factors under a risk-utility test to convince the jury that
trade-offs were in fact made in designing the product, thus tipping
the balance in favor of utility and diminished risk.
Pherson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.6" is a case in point.
At trial the tire manufacturer was found not to be strictly liable for
injuries suffered by the plaintiff when the pickup truck in which
she was riding went out of control as a result of a tire blowout.2
Conflicting evidence was offered on the issue of whether the tire
design was defective. 3 On appeal the plaintiff sought reversal of
56. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 433, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
60. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
61. 590 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1978).
62. Id. at 758.
63. Id. at 758-59.
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the judgment on the ground that the Barker decision had shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that the product was
not defective. 4 Without reaching the issue of whether Barker
should be applied retroactively, the court noted:65
[A]ppellant made only the barest prima facie showing of a design de-
fect. At trial Goodyear effectively assumed the burden of proof: Good-
year offered extensive testimony from both of its experts to the effect
that there were no practical alternatives. The closing arguments also
show that Goodyear willingly assumed this burden. Although when read
together the instructions technically do place the burden of proof on the
plaintiff, the instruction on defective design does not mention plaintiff's
burden and only instructs the jury to consider several factors in deter-
mining whether a defect in design existed. Thus, in light of the testi-
mony presented, the closing arguments, and the instruction, we con-
clude that as a practical matter the burden of proof regarding feasibility
of alternative designs was shouldered by the appellee."
Pherson calls attention to the fact that shifting the burden of
proof not only does not necessarily increase the defendant's burden,
but its impact on the plaintiff's burden might also be de minimis.
In fact, defense attorneys vigorously attempt to prove that a chal-
lenged design is not defective regardless of how the burdens of
proof are allocated by the court. Furthermore, the Pherson analysis
should also serve as a warning to plaintiffs not to be lulled into
complacency by the apparently minimal requirements under
Barker for establishing a prima facie case.
A literal reading of Barker suggests that a plaintiff could reach
the jury by simply showing that a product proximately caused his
injury. As one commentator has critically noted, under Barker
"[a]ll product related accidents have become presumptively action-
able."67 A recent California case, 8 however, decided in light of
64. Id. at 760.
65. The Pherson court found it significant that the jury had been instructed as follows:
The following factors are to be considered in determining whether a defect in design
existed when the tire left the manufacturer. One: the availability of an alternative design
which could have prevented the injury. Two: The feasibility of the alternative design in
terms of cost, practicality and technology. A design may not be found defective when,
under the present state of the art, alternative designs are unreasonable. A product need
not be found defective simply because an accident occurred.
Id. at 760.
66. Id. at 761.
67. Epstein, supra note 18, at 651. See also Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 411,
413, 579 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1978) ("Under that decision [Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co.] it appears
that a design defect case will always go to the jury if only the plaintiff can show that the
product caused the injury."); Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective
Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773,
782-97 (1979).
68. Korli v. Ford Motor Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 895, 149 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978). The same
court had dismissed plaintiffs case prior to Barker. 69 Cal. App. 3d 115, 137 Cal. Rptr. 828
(1977) (both cases in official reports advance sheets only)(decertified opinions).
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Barker, casts some doubt on this proposition by raising the ques-
tion of just how minimal the plaintiff's threshold of proof must be
to satisfy the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case.
In Korli v. Ford Motor Co.," plaintiff's two-year-old daughter
was riding in the rear of the car when she managed to pull the
unlatching handle on the door. At the time, the car was travelling
on the highway at a speed of sixty to sixty-five miles per hour. As
the rear-hinged door released, it was caught by the wind and forced
completely open. The child fell out and was killed by an oncoming
vehicle. Plaintiff's husband stopped the car and, in attempting to
rescue the child, was also killed." In a strict liability action, the
plaintiff alleged that the vehicle was defectively designed because
of the rear-hinging of the doors and the accessibility of the un-
latching lever.7" The jury's verdict for the plaintiff was reversed by
the appellate court on the ground that "the evidence in the case
failed to establish that the car in question was defectively
designed. 7 2 The California Supreme Court granted a hearing, but
while the case was pending, it rendered its decision in Barker and
returned the Korli case to the appellate court for reconsideration in
light of Barker.
73
The court of appeals affirmed its-earlier ruling, noting that
the jury "was undoubtedly influenced by the stark horror of this
case."'" The court looked to the first prong of the Barker test and
held that since the car did not fail to perform as an ordinary con-
sumer would expect, the plaintiff had "no basis for a complaint"
under this part of the test.75 Looking to the second prong, the court
reasoned as follows:
In order to invoke the second prong of the Barker test a plaintiff must
do more than show that an injury resulted during the use of the prod-
uct. What is required is a prima facie showing that some feature of the
product other than its simple generic quality caused the injury at a
time that the product was being put to its intended or reasonably fore-
seeable use .... There must be a nexus between the injury and a fea-
ture of the product which could, as a policy matter, justify in holding
the manufacturer responsible."
The court determined that the case should not have been sent
to the jury at all because the plaintiff failed to advance the quan-
69. 84 Cal. App. 3d 895, 149 Cal. Rptr. 98 (decertified opinion, in advance sheets only).
70. 149 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
71. Id. at 101-02.
72. Id. at 100.
73. Id. at 102.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 103.
76. Id. at 104.
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tum of evidence required to meet the initial burden of establishing
a prima facie case.7" The court seems to have muddled hopelessly
the issues of cause-in-fact and proximate cause, as the following
passage indicates:
[Tihe hinging of the doors or the location of the unlatching device was
not the cause of the accident. The proximate cause of the injury was the
opening of the door while the car was in high speed motion-an unfore-
seeable and unintended use of the product."
The court's superficial analysis of the facts and generally illog-
ical approach to the substantive issues in the case can be seriously
criticized, but this is beyond the scope of the immediate inquiry
(not to mention irrelevant, since the opinion has been withdrawn
by order of the court). What is of particular interest here, notwith-
standing withdrawal of the decision, is that the seemingly straight-
forward test announced in Barker will doubtless have to be inter-
preted on a case-by-case basis by the lower courts to determine just
how much evidence the plaintiff needs to advance before the bur-
den of proof can be shifted to the defendant.
Further, from a strictly pragmatic point of view, one should
note that plaintiffs' attorneys under Barker face no less an onerous
burden in gathering and mastering complicated evidentiary data in
a products case simply because the burden of proof will be shifted
to the defendant once a prima facie case is advanced. They still
will try to convince the trier of fact that the design in question is
defective and that the manufacturer could feasibly have adopted a
safer design. Further, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to master
those technical matters "peculiarly within the knowledge of the
manufacturer" if only to rebut the defendant's case competently.
In addition to reducing plaintiff's evidentiary burdens, the
Barker court's dual-standard test was designed to eliminate the
ring of negligence thought to inhere in the "unreasonably danger-
ous" terminology of section 402A.79 The court exhorts the trier of
fact to "focus on the product, not on the manufacturer's con-
duct.""0 The manufacturer will be held strictly liable when, on bal-
ance, the trier of fact determines that "the design is not as safe as
it should be." 8' I suggest that the court's use of the normative verb
"should" betrays the underlying negligence calculus that is ines-
capable in a risk-utility analysis. The jury may be charged to look
77. Id. at 105.
78. Id. at 104.
79. 20 Cal. 3d at 433, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
80. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
81. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 456, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
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at the product, but as a common sense matter the jury, in fact,
simply weighs the competing factors put in evidence and then
reaches a judgment about the judgment (i.e. conduct) of the manu-
facturer. When a jury decides that the risk of harm outweighs the
utility of a particular design (that the product is not as safe as it
should be), it is saying that in choosing the particular design and
cost trade-offs, the manufacturer exposed the consumer to greater
risk of danger than he should have. Conceptually and analytically,
this approach bespeaks negligence." As Dean Prosser noted:
The almost universal use of the phrase 'due care' to describe conduct
which it not negligent, should not be permitted to obscure the fact that
the real basis of negligence is not carelessness, but behavior which
should be recognized as involving unreasonable danger to others.8
Although the Barker decision may not have actually solved the
many and difficult analytic problems that prompted the California
Supreme Court to substitute the dual-standard test for the "unrea-
sonably dangerous" language of section 402A, it has proposed a
novel approach to design defect cases that courts and commenta-
tors alike may draw upon. Some of the more fertile areas of inquiry
that emerge from the Barker opinion are the interpretation of the
significance of ordinary consumer expectations as a "floor" rather
than a "ceiling" upon a manufacturer's responsibility; the shifting
of the burden of proof to the defendant; and a strong commitment
to continue defining a products liability cause of action for defec-
tive design in terms that involve a balancing of risk-utility
factors."
Since the Barker decision was reported, many courts have
been asked to reconsider the concept of "unreasonably dangerous"
in design defect cases. Divergent formulations of the consumer ex-
pectations test and risk-utility analyses have emerged. Although no
consensus has been reached, a survey of post-Barker opinions sug-
gests something of the creative ferment underlying what has aptly
been described as the "rich tapestry" of the developing common
law of products liability.85
82. Several commentators and courts specifically recognize that the basis of liability
in negligence and strict liability is fundamentally the same. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 1114
("[w]here the action is against the manufacturer of the product, an honest estimate might
very well be that there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result in
recovery where negligence does not."). See also Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Service,
16 Ill. App. 3d 339, 343-44, 306 N.E.2d 312, 315 (1973); Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502
S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
83. W. PROSSER, supra note 9 § 31, at 145.
84. The Barker case is analyzed thoroughly in Schwartz, Foreward: Understanding
Products Liability, 67 CALF. L. REv. 435 (1979).
85. Twerski, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment,
28 DaRK L. REv. 221, 223 (1979).
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]. CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS TESTS
The consumer expectations test as posed in the first prong of
the Barker dual standard is derived from the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, section 402A, comment i.86 Some courts continue to
use this approach, not as a threshold inquiry as in Barker,87 but as
a conclusive determinant of product defect. What is not clear from
the application of the test in some recent decisions is whether this
"ordinary consumer," who is possessed of the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to the characteristics of a product, is
a hypothetical construct (analogous to the "reasonable person" of
negligence) or whether it is the actual plaintiff in the action at
bar.88
The danger of not clarifying whether an objective or subjective
test is applicable in determining consumer expectations is that is-
sues of plaintiff's implied assumption of risk may inadvertently be
injected into the analysis. This danger will of course be magnified
where the risk involved is a patent one. A recent case before the
South Carolina Supreme Court reveals some of the problems im-
plicit in the application of a consumer expectations test. In Young
v. Tide Craft, Inc.," plaintiff's husband was drowned when the de-
fective steering mechanism in his boat failed, causing him to be
thrown overboard." Among the plaintiff's claims against the manu-
facturer was the allegation that the boat was defectively designed
because it did not have a kill switch (a safety device that cuts
power to the motor should the operator be thrown from his seat)."
The court, citing comment i of section 402A, noted that for a
86. See note 46 supra and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the consumer
expectations test, see Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a Product Have to Be?
42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv.
339, 348-52 (1974); Rheingold, WhatAre the Consumers' "Reasonable Expectations"? 22 Bus'.
LAW. 589 (1967); Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Func-
tion and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. Rv. 1109 (1974).
87. See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
88. See, e.g., Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d
326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975). Following the comment i approach, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reasoned that
whether a product contains an unreasonably dangerous defect depends upon the reason-
able expectations of the ordinary consumer concerning the characteristics of this type
of product. If the average consumer would reasonably anticipate the dangerous condition
of the product and fully appreciate the attendant risk of injury, it would not be unreason-
ably dangerous and defective. This is an objective test and is not dependent upon the
knowledge of the particular injured consumer, although his knowledge may be evidence
of contributory negligence under the circumstances.
Id. at 332, 230 N.W.2d at 798-99.
89. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
90. Id. at 458, 242 S.E.2d at 673.
91. Id. at 466, 242 S.E.2d at 677.
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plaintiff to recover under the theory of strict liability for failure to
install a safety device, the absence of the safety device must consti-
tute a defect that makes the product dangerous beyond the con-
templation of the ordinary consumer.92 The court's analysis of the
facts of the case, however, turned not on the knowledge common to
the community, but rather on the special knowledge of plaintiff's
decedent, an experienced boater. The court reasoned,
[i]t is common knowledge that a normal risk of boating is that of being
thrown overboard. While the test set out . . . is an objective one and
knowledge common to the community must be attributed to [plaintiff's
decedent], there can, nevertheless, be no question of his awareness of
this risk.
3
Although decedent's knowledge of the dangers of boating was
established during the trial," it should not have been dispositive of
the issue of "unreasonably dangerous" under the literal terms of
comment P1 The question raised by the plaintiff's allegations was
not whether the general dangers of boating were commonly known,
but whether the specific danger of a boat without a kill switch
would exceed the expectations of an ordinary consumer. The court
failed to ask the latter question and instead looked to the dece-
dent's boating experience. The court found that he must have
known of the risks attendant upon the failure of the manufacturer
to install a kill switch." While it is one thing to impute the general
knowledge of the dangers of boating to the decedent, it is quite
another to apply a subjective test based on the decedent's personal
knowledge and infer that the ordinary consumer would also possess
such knowledge. If the court says it is going to apply the objective
standard of the comment i test and then decides that this decedent
is barred from recovery because he knew of the danger, then the
court must have, impliedly at least, imputed decedent's special
knowledge to the ordinary consumer.
One of the more troubling aspects of the decision is that, pre-
92. Id. at 470, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
93. Id. at 471-72, 242 S.E.2d at 680. The Utah legislature adopted a similar test:
"[Unreasonably dangerous" means that the product was dangerous to an extent be-
yond which would be contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user
of that product in that community considering the product's characteristics . . . to-
gether with any actual knowledge, training or experience possessed by that particular
buyer, user or consumer.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(2) (1977).
94. Testimony at trial revealed that the decedent had gone fishing almost every week-
end in the ten years prior to the accident. 270 S.C. at 472, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
95. The proof of decedent's specific knowledge of the danger of the boat without a kill
switch, if relevant at all, should have been considered only on the issues of contributory
negligence or assumption of risk.
96. 270 S.C. at 471-72, 242 S.E.2d at 680.
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sumably, had the plaintiffs decedent been a less enthusiastic
boater who had gone fishing perhaps only five or six times a year,
his executrix might have prevailed since knowledge of the dangers
arising from the operation of the boat without a kill switch might
not have been imputable to him as the hypothetical ordinary con-
sumer. Thus, the design of the product under this analysis could be
deemed to be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous as
to one plaintiff, but not defective as to another. Obviously, this
type of approach, wherein the court does not vigorously adhere to
an objective standard, can lead to inconsistent verdicts when the
same product design is being evaluated.
Even if the "ordinary consumer" test were to be consistently
defined as an objective, hypothetical construct, two additional lim-
itations inherent in the test make it a functionally inadequate tool
for formulating a rational definition of defect. First, the consumer
expectations test has a built-in tendency to short-circuit the ana-
lytic process." That is, once a court determines what an ordinary
consumer's expectations are, the disposition of a case becomes
rather routine. Abbreviating the analysis by failing to take into ac-
count any risk-utility factors, which would move the inquiry be-
yond reasonable consumer expectations may unjustly prejudice a
plaintiff. For example, a plaintiff is especially likely to be disad-
vantaged when the danger or risk would be readily apparent to the
ordinary consumer. Under such circumstances the product could
not, as a matter of law, be unreasonably dangerous and therefore
the manufacturer may escape liability." This will be true even
though we may know with certainty that the manufacturer could
have cost-efficiently eliminated the risk. It has been suggested that
"there is a strong argument that the Restatement language is but
an updated version of the patent danger rule."" Leading commen-
tators and most courtsI1 have roundly criticized the patent danger
97. Twerski, supra note 22, at 309-12.
98. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 576 P.2d 725, 730-31 (Mont. 1978)
("Under this type of instruction [consumer expectations test] it would be virtually impossi-
ble for an open and obvious condition to be unreasonably dangerous. For all practical pur-
poses recovery would be limited to latent conditions. . . . [T]here are no policy reasons to
refuse recovery if the condition is one that is open and obvious.").
99. Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products
Liability Litigation, 52 Tax. L. Rav. 1303, 1304 & n.23 (1974).
100. See James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968);
Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tax. L. Rav. 398 (1970); Mar-
schall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently
Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1065 (1973); Twerski, Old Wine in a New
Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 IowA L. Rav. 1
(1974). See also, Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Yoder
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doctrine as not only seriously undermining the duty of manufactur-
ers to design safe products but also as unconscionably denying re-
covery to injured plaintiffs.
The second inherent limitation of the consumer expectations
test is the haphazard subjectivity necessarily brought to bear by
the trier of fact in attempting to discern what in fact reasonable
consumer expectations are. When the defect is latent and the prod-
uct complicated in design (as most products now seem to be), it
cannot be said with any certainty that consumers know what to
expect because they usually do not know how safely *the product
could or should have been made. 101 If this proposition is true, then
presumably jurors, who are themselves ordinary consumers, do not
know what the plaintiff or the hypothetical objective consumer ex-
pected in the way of safety. How, then, can jurors charged under a
consumer expectations test make a determination of whether to
impose liability? In all probability, they guess. "The consumer ex-
pectation test takes subjectivity to its most extreme end. Each trier
of fact is likely to have a different understanding of abstract con-
sumer expectations.
'102
Despite its fundamintal inadequacy as a basis for a theory of
liability, the notion of consumer expectations as defined in com-
ment i to section 402A is so deeply embedded in the warranty heri-
tage"3 underlying strict products liability that courts have gener-
ally been reluctant to eliminate it altogether from a product defect
analysis. Thus, to buttress the comment i approach, some courts
have fashioned a consumer expectations test with a risk-utility
base.104 That is, in seeking to establish that a product is dangerous
Co. v. General Copper & Brass Co., 474 F.2d 1339 (3rd Cir. 1973); Byrns v. Riddell Inc., 113
Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976); Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 2d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85
Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E. 2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d
115 (1976). Contra Hunt v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 147 Ga. App. 44, 248 S.E.2d 15
(1978).
101. Wade, supra note 18, at 829.
102. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LrABLrTY AcT (hereinafter cited as UPLA), Analysis §
104(B), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,724 (1979). See also Montgomery & Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Liability for Defective Products, 27
S.C.L. REv. 803, 823 (1976) ("[An attempt to determine the consumer's reasonable expecta-
tions of safety concerning a technologically complex product may well be an exercise in
futility, for the consumer may have at most only a generalized expectancy-perhaps more
accurately only an unconscious hope-that the product will not harm him if he treats it with
a reasonable amount of care").
103. Many commentators have recognized the warranty heritage of strict liability. See,
e.g., Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. Rav. 339, 348 (1974)
("The consumer expectations test is natural since strict liability in tort developed from the
law of warranty. The law of implied warranty is vitally concerned with protecting justified
expectations since this is a fundamental policy of the law of contracts.").
104. See, e.g., Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Seattle-
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to an extent beyond that which the ordinary consumer would ex-
pect, the trier of fact must first determine what reasonable con-
sumer expectations would be. Under a literal application of com-
ment i, the trier of fact would be invited to rely on some vague
commonsense notion of what the ordinary consumer expects in the
way of safety. The court would offer no guidelines to help the trier
of fact in making this crucial determination. Nonetheless, by
grounding the comment i test on a risk-utility base, some courts
have recognized the need to define for the jury exactly which fac-
tors should be considered in discerning what the objective ordinary
consumer expects. Factors considered relevant in determining the
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer include, "[T]he
relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from
the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or
minimizing the risk." ' 5 These factors, of course, involve the tradi-
tional balancing test usually invoked to prove unreasonableness in
a design case.
Burdening a product defect analysis with the conceptual bag-
gage of the hypothetical ordinary consumer adds essentially noth-
ing of substance to a straightforward risk-utility balancing ap-
proach. While offering a deferential nod to the warranty heritage of
strict products liability, the single-standard test needlessly pro-
tracts the analysis, thereby inviting confusion. One should recall
that the Barker approach separates the analysis into discrete chan-
nels of inquiry. The first prong of the test involves reasonable con-
sumer expectations; then, as a separate matter and without look-
ing through the perspective of the hypothetical consumer, the trier
of fact considers the evidence and balances utility against risk in
determining whether or not the product is defective. The risk-util-
ity based consumer expectations test, however, works quite differ-
ently. It involves a single standard, not a dual standard as in
Barker. In other words, to determine if a product is unsafe beyond
the ordinary consumer's contemplation, the trier of fact must first
decide what this hypothetical ordinary consumer would reasonably
contemplate. To do this, the trier of fact must balance the various
risk-utility factors involved. The conclusions drawn from this
First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). In Aller the Iowa Supreme
Court emphasized:
In order to prove that a product is unreasonably dangerous, the injured plaintiff must
prove. . . that it was unreasonable for such a danger to exist. Proof of unreasonableness
involves a balancing process. On one side of the scale is the utility of the product and
on the other is the risk of its use.
268 N.W.2d at 835.
105. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
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weighing of factors is then said to constitute the reasonable expec-
tations of the ordinary consumer."' At least with a dual standard,
the problems of the patent danger doctrine and the low esteem in
which the ordinary consumer may hold a particular product are left
behind when the trier of fact gets down to balancing the risk-utility
factors. With a single-standard test, however, there is the danger
that these considerations will improperly infect the balancing test
with notions of implied assumption of risk where a patent design
defect is at issue.
107
The Supreme Court of Washington recently had an opportu-
nity to apply this consumer oriented risk-utility test. In Estate of
Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co.,1"8 plaintiff's decedent was
killed when his tractor-trailer went off the highway, allegedly as a
result of a defective wheel and tire.08 On appeal from a verdict for
defendant, plaintiff challenged the court's jury instruction on the
ground that it permitted the manufacturer to argue that it should
not be liable because it had no reason to foresee the type of wheel
failure that occurred.1 Plaintiff maintained that by allowing such
an argument to be made, the action was converted from a strict
liability claim to a negligence claim.1 The Washington Supreme
Court reasoned otherwise, holding that the jury instruction was not
erroneous since it focused on the buyer's expectations: "The jury
does not evaluate the seller's actions. It only determines whether
the product is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer.'
'12
106. Id. at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
107. A recent case in Washington aptly illustrates this problem. Although the risk-
utility based consumer expectations test had long been the accepted approach to strict prod-
ucts liability in that state, a trial court nevertheless misapplied the test, falling into the
patent danger trap. In Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 19 Wash. App. 515, 576 P.2d 426
(1978), the plaintiff stewardess sustained injuries when she stepped through an open galley
escape hatch of a DC-10. Plaintiff alleged that the hatch cover created an unreasonably
dangerous condition for cabin attendants because it was not equipped with a spring device
that would automatically close the hatch cover when the escape hatch was not in use. It was
uncontroverted that plaintiff was familiar with the design and operation of the escape hatch.
Moments before falling through, she had seen another stewardess come up through the open-
ing in the floor, announce a power failure necessitating use of the lower galley, and then
withdraw back down into the escape hatch. The trial court, apparently relying on a literal
consumer expectations test, granted summary judgment and dismissed the action against the
aircraft manufacturer. The court of appeals reversed, emphasizing that "awareness of the
existence of an obvious dangerous condition does not, of itself, absolve the manufacturer of
liability for a defective design." Id. at 523-24, 576 P.2d at 431.
108. 91 Wash. 2d 111, 587 P.2d 160 (1978).
109. Id. at 113, 587 P.2d at 161.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 114, 587 P.2d at 162.
112. Id. at 118, 587 P.2d at 164.
[Vol. 33:593
TEST FOR DESIGN DEFECT
The jury instruction upheld in Ryder was, in fact, a simple
risk-utility balancing test cloaked in the verbal trappings of the
"reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer." Consider the
enormous possibilities for confusion that abound in this kind of in-
struction. First the jury is charged that the plaintiff must establish
that the wheel was defective and/or was not reasonably safe for its con-
templated use .... This means that the wheel must have been defec-
tive and/or unsafe to an extent beyond that which would be reasonably
contemplated by the ordinary user with the ordinary knowledge com-
mon to the community as to the wheel's characteristics .... 1
Before the jurors have a chance to figure out the worrisome ques-
tion of what the "ordinary knowledge common to the community"
is concerning the progression of fatigue cracks in the gutter area
beneath a removable flange,"1 they receive another instruction pur-
portedly telling them how to make this determination. Unfortu-
nately, this second instruction has nothing to do with knowledge
that can in any realistic sense be said to be "common to the com-
munity." Rather, the instruction urges the trier of fact to evaluate
the specific technical data offered at trial as follows:
In determining the reasonable expectations of the "ordinary user" of a
product, you may consider the following factors:
1. The usefulness and the utility of the design.
2. The likelihood, if any, that the design would cause injury, and if so,
the probable seriousness of the injury.
3. The availability of a substitute design which would meet the same
need and which would lessen the likelihood, if any, of injury.
4. The ability to eliminate any unsafe aspects of the design without
impairing its usefulness, or making it too expensive or otherwise impair-
ing its utility."15
Clearly, this so-called consumer expectations test is, at its
base, a risk-utility balancing analysis. Fusing this to an ordinary
consumer point of view merely invites error and confusion. The
common sense meaning of the first part of the instruction urges the
trier of fact to bring his own experiences to bear in speculating
about the ordinary knowledge common to the community. As an
ordinary member of the community the juror must decide what he
knows about and reasonably expects from the product. The juror
may, however, ignore this part of the instruction and look instead
to the second part, which urges a risk-utility balancing. Under this
approach, the juror does not need the notion of the ordinary con-
sumer because it is fundamentally irrelevant to the task of weigh-
ing the various factors outlined by the court.
113. Id. at 115-16 n.2, 587 P.2d at 162-63 n.2.
114. Id. at 113, 587 P.2d at 161.
115. Id. at 115-16 n.2, 587 P.2d at 163 n.2.
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The confused, divergent, and unjust decisions that may result
from the use of a consumer expectations test, either applied alone
or in conjunction with a risk-utility base, should be avoided. Other-
wise, as Professor Epstein has aptly noted: "The modern design
litigation case . . . is an invitation to the kind of standardless ad-
judication that reduces a lawsuit to a glorious, if expensive, game
of chance.""'
IV. REASONABLY PRUDENT MANUFACTURER TEST
A candid acknowledgment of the negligence approach necessa-
.rily underlying a risk-utility analysis, which weighs the design al-
ternatives faced by a manufacturer, has led many courts to adopt a
prudent manufacturer test' 7 for design defect. An important ra-
tionale for adopting such a test is that it "preserves the use of fa-
miliar terms and thought processes with which courts, lawyers, and
jurors customarily deal." ' Nevertheless, most of the courts that
have adopted a risk-utility analysis insist that they have not ac-
cepted a pure negligence approach to design defect either because
the constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition of the prod-
uct is imputed to the manufacturer or because the jury is admon-
ished to focus its attention on the condition of the product rather
than on the manufacturer's conduct.
In the leading case of Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co.,"' for
example, the Oregon Supreme Court defined the test as follows: "A
dangerously defective article would be one which a reasonable per-
son would not put into the stream of commerce if he had
knowledge of its harmful character. The test, therefore, is whether
the seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the
risk involved."'' 0 What distinguishes this test from an ordinary neg-
ligence analysis is the imposition on the manufacturer of construc-
tive knowledge of the dangerous condition of the product.'
Courts that have adopted the prudent manufacturer standard
acknowledge that even though it probably produces similar results
as would be achieved under a consumer expectations test, the focus
116. Epstein, supra note 18, at 652.
117. See note 125 infra.
118. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974).
119. 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
120. Id. at 492, 525 P.2d at 1036 (emphasis in original).
121. See Wade, supra note 18. See also Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. at 494-
95, 525 P.2d at 1037; Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 397-400, 564, 675-
77 (1977); Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 416-17 & n.12, 547 P.2d 132, 142, & n.12
(1976); Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire, 91 Wash. 2d 111, 119, 587 P.2d 160, 164.
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of inquiry is quite different." As in negligence cases, the attention
of the jury under the prudent manufacturer test should be directed
toward the conduct of the manufacturer. Nevertheless, these
courts, in applying the test to a cause of action in strict liability,
insist that the analysis turns not on the negligent conduct of the
manufacturer but on a characterization of the product as being
dangerously defective."' It seems that a test that evaluates conduct
would lead to a conclusion that characterizes that conduct; yet the
prudent manufacturer test demands that the result describe the
nature of the product, not the nature of the manufacturer's behav-
ior. The only real difference, however, between the prudent manu-
facturer test in strict liability and a traditional negligence ap-
proach is that in the former the manufacturer is deemed to have
scienter (knowledge of the risk of danger from the product),
whether or not he reasonably could have been expected to have
such knowledge. The confusion in this area can perhaps be best
illustrated by two recent decisions from the New Jersey Supreme
Court.
In Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.,1U decided in April
1978, the court declined to adopt the Barker test and affirmed the
central importance of a finding that the challenged product be
"unreasonably dangerous," as defined in terms of the Wade-Keeton
prudent manufacturer test.125 A little over a year later, in Suter v.
122. The court in Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co. noted:
[W]e feel that the two standards are the same because a seller acting reasonably would
be selling the same product which a reasonable consumer believes he is purchasing. That
is to say, a manufacturer who would be negligent in marketing a given product, consider-
ing its risks, would necessarily be marketing a product which fell below the reasonable
expectations of consumers who purchase it. The foreseeable uses to which a product
could be put would be the same in the minds of both the seller and the buyer unless
one of the parties was not acting reasonably.
269 Or. at 493, 525 P.2d at 1037; see note 205 infra.
123. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
124. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
125. What has come to be known as the Wade-Keeton prudent manufacturer test rests
on the threshold premise that scienter of a product's harmfulness will be imputed to the
manufacturer. For liability to be imposed, various factors must be weighed to determine
whether the challenged product is to be deemed unreasonably dangerous (i.e. not duly safe).
Dean Wade has posited the following list of factors to be considered:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the
public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the
probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not
be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product.
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San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co.,126 the court once again con-
fronted the issue of defining defectiveness. This time the majority
determined that while the prudent manufacturer test of Cepeda es-
sentially reflected the correct approach, the jury instruction requir-
ing a finding of "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" im-
posed "a greater burden on plaintiff than is warranted."'27
The Suter court sought to refine the analysis brought to bear
in Cepeda but unfortunately succeeded in fashioning no clearer test
for product defect. In fact, the court added new language that only
served to muddy the waters further. Nevertheless, analysis of the
court's shift in position's is of particular interest since it calls at-
tention to some of the linguistic and conceptual traps that tend to
occlude the development of a uniform, reasonable, and fair test for
product defect in design cases.
In Cepeda the court followed the Wade-Keeton approach to
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their
avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the prod-
uct, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Wade, supra note 18, at 837-38. Under Dean Wade's formulation, scienter of the dangerous
condition of the product is imputed to the manufacturer and thus supplied as a matter of
law as of the time when the manufacturer placed the product into the stream of commerce.
"A [product] is not duly safe if it is so likely to be harmful to persons [or property] that a
reasonable prudent manufacturer [supplier], who had actual knowledge of its harmful char-
acter would not place it on the market." Id. at 839-40.
Dean Keeton's test for imposing strict liability on a manufacturer of defective products
also relies on a balancing of various risk-utility factors. In contrast to Dean Wade's approach,
however, scienter is imputed to the manufacturer as of the time of trial rather than as of the
time of manufacture or sale.
[A] product ought to be regarded as "unreasonably dangerous" at the time of sale if a
reasonable man with knowledge of the product's condition, and an appreciation of fill
the risks found to exist by the jury at the time of trial, would not now market the
product, or, if he did market it, would at least market it pursuant to a different set of
warnings and instructions as to its use. . . . Since the test is not one of negligence, it is
not based upon the risks and dangers that the maker should have, in the exercise of
ordinary care, known about. It is, rather, danger in fact, as that danger is found to be
at the time of trial that controls.
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design
of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 559, 568 (1969).
126. 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
127. Id. at 174-75, 406 A.2d at 152.
128. The New Jersey Supreme Court is deeply split over this shift. Justices Mountain
and Sullivan joined in Justice Clifford's strongly worded concurrence in the Suter case, which
sounded a vehement dissent with the majority's analysis: "I concur in the judgment of the
Court. And, most respectfully, in not much else it has done today. Particularly do I deplore
the bluntly administered coup de grace to Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co. [citation
omitted], barely weaned and now the victim of judicial infanticide." 81 N.J. at 178, 406 A.2d
at 154 (Clifford, J., concurring).
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strict liability, i2' but only in design defect cases. 130 The plaintiff in
Cepeda was injured while operating a pelletizing machine from
which a bolted safety guard had been removed. The machine was
designed without an electronic interlock, a device that would auto-
matically have rendered the machine inoperative if the guard were
not in place. "' Testimony at trial revealed that routine operation of
the machine often required frequent removal of the guard. 3 2 An in-
terlock mechanism could feasibly have been installed at a cost of
twenty-five or thirty dollars.' A verdict for the plaintiff was re-
versed by the appellate division, which concluded that as a matter
of law the machine was free of defect as designed.lu The court rea-
soned that if a machine is designed with a safety guard, which is
not used, the manufacturer "cannot be held responsible for unfore-
seeable negligence on the part of third parties in operating or per-
mitting operation of the equipment without the device." '
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this approach out of
hand, characterizing it as nothing more than a warranty test: "The
fact that the instant machine was commercially 'reasonably fit for
its intended purpose' of pelletizing plastic strands is obviously ir-
relevant to the postulate of strict tort liability to a workman in-
jured by reason of the unsafety of the machine due to a design de-
fect. ' " ' The court was particularly concerned that manufacturers
not be able to escape under strict liability on the ground of misuse
when the "actual use proximate to the injury was objectively fore-
seeable.'' It was in response to this untenable potentiality that
the court turned to the Wade-Keeton approach:
[T]he remaining determinative question as to affirmative liability is
whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer with such foreknowledge
129. See note 125 supra; Keeton, supra note 31; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
130. The Cepeda court insisted that a sharp distinction be drawn between manufactur-
ing and design defects, and that different criteria for imposing liability be applied to each.
Manufacturing defects give rise to prima facie liability for physical harm, there being no need
for the plaintiff to show unreasonable danger. 76 N.J. at 170, 386 A.2d at 825. The Suter
majority, on the other hand, held that the same principles of strict liability should apply to
manufacturing and design defect cases. The court noted that while the nature of the proof
may differ, "the ultimate jury test is the same." 81 N.J. at 174, 406 A.2d at 152. See also
Twerski, supra note 85 (analysis of the many problems implicit in the issue of distinguishing
between manufacturing and design defects for the purpose of imposing liability).
131. 76 N.J. at 161, 386 A.2d at 820.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 166-67, 386 A.2d at 823.
134. 138 N.J. Super. 344, 351 A.2d 22, rev'd 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
135. Id. at 351, 351 A.2d at 26.
136. 76 N.J. at 176, 386 A.2d at 828. See also Biss v. Tenneco, 64 A.D.2d 204, 409
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
137. 76 N.J. at 177, 386 A.2d at 828
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would have put such a product into the stream of commerce after con-
sidering the hazards as well as the utility of the machine, the ease of
incorporating a remedial interlock, the likelihood vel non that the ma-
chine would be used only with the guard, and such other factors as
would bear upon the prudence of a reasonable manufacturer in so decid-
ing whether to market the machine.1 38
Under this approach, the "unreasonably dangerous" component of
section 402A is indispensable. The analysis of design defect liabil-
ity is "substantially coordinate with liability on negligence princi-
ples.""'3 Thus, reasonableness is the pivotal issue upon which the
risk-utility analysis and the imposition of liability turns under both
doctrines. What sets strict liability apart under Cepeda, however,
is that foreseeability of the risk of harm is imputed to the
manufacturer.'40
A significant problem that emerges from a hindsight balancing
test (in which knowledge of the risk at the time of trial is imputed
to the manufacturer)' is that manufacturers may be held liable for
dangerous propensities that were scientifically unknowable at the
time the product was placed into the stream of commerce. If a
manufacturer is precluded from defending on grounds of the scien-
tific impossibility of having foreseen the potential hazards, a risk-
utility analysis becomes a shallow fiction.' It is questionable
whether a criterion for liability purportedly based on a notion of
reasonableness can be justly and fairly applied when cognition of
risks is imposed as a matter of law rather than as a matter of fact.
The threat of imposing what is tantamount to absolute liabil-
ity on the manufacturer for all harm resulting from the use of its
product is suggested in other areas of the Cepeda opinion as well.
The specific facts of the case are particularly revealing in this re-
gard. Cepeda is not a simple "failure to install a safety device"
case. Rather, it involves a failure to install a safety device on a
safety device. The fingerguard provided by the manufacturer was
not casually hinged to the machine, thus making it possible for the
unskilled worker to lift it carelessly at will. Indeed, it was bolted in
138. Id. at 163, 386 A.2d at 821.
139. Id. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825.
140. Id.
141. This test is derived from Dean Keeton's formulation in Product Liability and the
Meaning of Defect, supra note 31. See note 125 supra.
142. In prescription drug cases based on strict liability for failure to warn, the majority
of courts have refused to hold a manufacturer responsible in the absence of knowledge or
reason to know of the dangers inherent in the product. Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d
288 (7th Cir. 1972); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Woodhill v.
Parke, Davis & Co., - N.E.2d - (Il. 1980); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974). Contra Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099
(1976).
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front of the in-running nip rollers and could be removed only with
a wrench. 1 3 This fact coupled with the evidence at trial that even
interlock mechanisms can be rendered inoperative,'" raises the
question of whether there is any point short of the absurd at which
the manufacturer can be said to have reasonably discharged its
duty not to expose users of its product to unreasonable danger. If
overriding an interlock mechanism is objectively foreseeable, need
the reasonably prudent manufacturer install an interlock interlock?
In Suter, the majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court 5 at-
tempted to coalesce the warranty and negligence theories underly-
ing strict products liability."6 Under this approach, the "unreason-
ably dangerous" component of section 402A is eliminated, with the
notions of "improper design" and "reasonable fitness" substituted
in its stead. As a threshold matter, the Suter majority adverts to
what it considers to be the basic premise underlying strict products
liability: "[O]ne engaged in the business of selling a product im-
pliedly represents that goods which it places in the stream of com-
merce are free of defects, that is, they are reasonably suitable, safe
and fit for the purposes for which those have been sold.' 4 7 Thus,
the majority seems at first glance to favor the notion of a warranty
of merchantability as the appropriate analytic framework within
which the determination of liability for product-related injuries will
be made. In Cepeda, on the other hand, the majority emphasized
that design defect liability was to be defined through an approach
"substantially coordinate with liability on negligence principles."" 8
To reflect this apparent shift, the Suter majority noted that
"[d]efining the strict liability principle in terms of a defect and an
unreasonably dangerous condition does not advance an under-
standing of the concept and will not assist a jury's comprehension
of the issues which it must resolve.'
4
9
If warranty is to provide the parameters for determining liabil-
ity, requiring the plaintiff to prove that a defect was unreasonably
dangerous might indeed seem a greater burden than necessary. The
143. 76 N.J. at 167, 386 A.2d at 823.
144. Id.
145. See note 128 supra. Although the decision in Suter was unanimous for affirmance,
the opinion reflects the views of only a bare majority (four of seven) of the court. Interestingly,
the three concurring justices here had been joined by a temporarily assigned justice in
Cepeda, where they had managed to secure a majority opinion.
146. In Suter the plaintiff was injured when his hand was caught in the cylinders of a
sheet-metal rolling machine. The alleged defect was a failure to install a rotary guard around
the gear lever. 81 N.J. at 157, 406 A.2d at 143.
147. Id. at 169, 406 A.2d at 149.
148. 76 N.J. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825.
149. 81 N.J. at 176, 406 A.2d at 153.
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Suter majority proposed, instead, that the plaintiff prove that "the
product design was improper." 5 ' At least this terminology is con-
sistent with a warranty approach. Citing Greenman, the court de-
scribed what "improper" means: "the product is not reasonably
suitable and safe and fails to perform, contrary to the user's rea-
sonable expectation that it would 'safely do the jobs for which it
was built'.' 5
Lest the reader hastily conclude (as Justice Clifford seems to
have done in his concurrence)152 that the majority has transformed
the manufacturer's duty to fit the sales law model of a warranty of
merchantability, the decision quickly serves up an additional de-
fect test based on the reasonably prudent manufacturer analysis.
This approach comes into play when the reasonable expectations of
the consumer are absent from the case,'53 as when the danger was
patent or it could not be said that the consumer or user would
know what to expect. The proofs in this respect relate to the con-
duct of the manufacturer. Did the manufacturer act as a reasona-
bly prudent person by designing the item as he did and by placing
it on the market in that condition, or should he have designed it to
incorporate certain safety features or some other modifications?'"
In order to ascertain whether the manufacturer acted prudently,
the jury must balance the familiar risk-utility factors, all of which
were thoughtfully described in Cepeda" as being substantially co-
ordinate with a negligence analysis.' As noted earlier, what distin-
guished this approach from being a true negligence calculus is the
court's insistence that scienter be imputed to the manufacturer.
For all the warranty language scattered throughout the opinion
and the apparent shift from a standard of "unreasonably danger-
ous" to one of "improper design," the decision is in fact nothing
more than a rather muddled variation of the Barker test. Both de-
cisions involve a dual test calling for a consumer expectations anal-
150. Id. at 170, 406 A.2d at 150.
151. Id. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150 (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)).
152. Justice Clifford noted with considerable dismay:
By introducing fitness and suitability into the formula, the Court has suddenly trans-
formed the manufacturer's duty. Heretofore the obligation has been to avoid marketing
products yvhich contain harmful defects (citations omitted), henceforth it is to avoid
putting in the stream of commerce goods which are unsuitable. This before the ink is
yet dry on our explicit rejection of the standard of "reasonable fitness" [in Cepeda].
81 N.J. at 179, 406 A.2d at 155 (emphasis in original).
153. Id. at 171, 406 A.2d at 150.
154. Id.
155. 76 N.J. at 171-75, 386 A.2d at 825-27.
156. 81 N.J. at 171-72, 406 A.2d at 150-51.
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ysis on the one hand and a risk-utility balancing analysis on the
other. In Barker, the prongs are posed in the disjunctive: the court
must instruct the jury that a product is defective in design if it
fails to meet ordinary consumer expectations or if plaintiff proves
that the product's design caused injury and the defendant fails to
prove that the benefits of the design outweigh the risk of danger
inherent in the design. 5 7 Posing the bifurcated test in this way al-
lows for conceptually discrete analytic approaches-the first involv-
ing a warranty perspective, the second calling forth a risk-utility
calculus. In Suter, however, the clear distinction that was implicit
in the Barker court's posing of alternative theories of liability is
adhered to by the New Jersey court only in its linguistic formula-
tion of the test, not in its application of the test to the facts of the
case on appeal.
The two aspects of the Suter test are not counterpoised in the
disjunctive; instead, the trial court is urged to provide cumulative
instructions. " First, and as a general overriding theme, the court
must charge the jury "that a manufacturer has an obligation to
distribute products which are reasonably fit, suitable and safe.""'
Under this part of the test, a product will be deemed defective and
improperly designed if it fails to meet reasonable consumer expec-
tations as to safety. "' Second, if consumer expectations are not in-
volved in the case, for whatever reason, the trial court is instructed
to add a charge asking the jury to determine "whether the manu-
facturer, it being deemed to have known of the harmful propensity
of the product, acted as a reasonably prudent one."'' The major-
ity's application of its own analysis to the facts in the Suter case
gives some indication of the confusion likely to result in future
cases as trial courts in New Jersey attempt to fashion proper jury
instructions.
In Suter, the plaintiff was injured when he accidentally
brushed against an unshielded gear lever on a sheet metal rolling
machine, thus activating the rollers and pulling his fingers into the
machine. "2 In determining whether the merchantability aspect of
the jury instruction needs to be augmented by the reasonably pru-
dent manufacturer test involving risk-utility analysis, one must
first ascertain whether the plaintiff is relying on a theory involving
defeated consumer expectations. The majority poses the issue in
this way:
157. 20 Cal. 3d at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
158. 81 N.J. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150.
161. Id. at 177, 406 A.2d at 153.
162. Id. at 156-57, 406 A.2d at 143.
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We perceive that the only additional question to be put to the jury in a
case involving a design defect, vis-a-vis other defects, is whether the
product design was improper. In some improper design situations the
nature of the proofs will be the same as in other unintended defect
cases. This occurs when the product is not suitable and safe because of
a failure to perform, contrary to the user's reasonable expectation that
it would "safely do the jobs for which it was built.""'
Clearly, the plaintiff in Suter could not rest his case in this
quarter: Suter purchased the machine for his company, had oper-
ated it "probably a thousand times" over an eight-year period and
was completely conversant with every aspect of the eguipment. He
knew that he could deactivate the machine either by stepping on
the treadle at his feet or pushing the stop button. He knew that
pushing or moving the lever would activate the rollers. " '
In light of the plaintiff's obvious inability under the facts to
impose liability upon the manufacturer on a theory of defeated
consumer expectations, one would logically anticipate that the
court would require that the jury be charged to consider various
risk-utility factors in determining whether the manufacturer acted
in a reasonably prudent manner in designing the product as he did.
The majority, however, seems to be satisfied with something less
than this. It approved without reservation the trial judge's charge,
which "posed the issue in terms of whether the product as designed
by defendant was reasonably fit for the ordinary use for which it
was intended." ' The decision did not even mention the failure of
the trial court to add a charge instructing the jury to consider the
issue from the perspective of the reasonably prudent manufacturer.
Although evidence relating to risk-utility factors was presented at
trial, the instruction itself did not ask the jury to consider this data
specifically in determining liability. In view of the majority's ex-
plicitly stated goal to clarify the constituent elements of a proper
jury charge in a strict liability action, 6 it is not altogether clear
how the wording of the analysis can be reconciled with the court's
tacit approval of the trial court's failure to advance the second
prong of the recommended jury charge in a design defect case. The
curious juxtaposition of warranty and negligence language in the
case adds to the already considerable confusion that has emerged
from the dual Greenman/Restatement heritage of strict products
liability. As Justice Clifford noted in his scathing concurrence:
163. Id. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150 (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963)).
164. Id. at 165, 406 A.2d at 147.
165. Id. at 154, 168, 406 A.2d at 142, 149.
166. Id. at 158, 406 A.2d at 143.
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With the greatest deference I suggest that my brothers of the majority,
all of whom are capable of some of the most precise thinking and most
lucid judicial writing the bench and bar of this nation have been privi-
leged to witness, have hardly simplified the jury's task by this obfusca-
tion-a mixture of the apples of warranty with the oranges of negli-
gence. I for one quite honestly do not understand how the trial judges
and jurors are to go about their business; and if I do not, I venture to
say there may be some of them who will share my dullness of
comprehension.
17
At least one thing is very clear in the Suter opinion-the risk-
utility balancing of factors involved in the prudent manufacturer
test is to remain, as in Cepeda,"8s a hindsight perspective'" for eval-
uating the conduct of the manufacturer. 7 ' Thus, the possibility
that a manufacturer might be held liable for the dangerous propen-
sities of a product that were scientifically unknowable at the time
of manufacture' continues to raise serious questions about the
basic fairness of the prudent manufacturer test. Burying the defen-
sive matter of state of the art in a hindsight risk-utility analysis
under which scienter of harm is imputed to the manufacturer, the
court allows for the possibility that, nothwithstanding unknowabil-
ity,72 the risk of harm posed by a product may still be found to
exceed its utility. Since the court's model instruction casts the defi-
nition of the duty owed in terms of the merchantability or fitness of
the product itself, a manufacturer might be held absolutely liable
even more readily than under Cepeda for harms that arose from
risks that were unknowable ivhen the product was manufactured.
Two other recent cases' in which the reasonably prudent
manufacturer test was advanced examine the difficulties inherent
in the plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case. A liberal
application of the reasonably prudent manufacturer test might per-
mit a plaintiff to recover not only when a risk was unknowable, but
on a mere showing that a possible alternative design was availa-
167. Id. at 184, 406 A.2d at 157 (Clifford, J., concurring).
168. 76 N.J. at 172, 386 A.2d at 825.
169. 81 N.J. at 171, 406 A.2d at 150.
170. Id. at 171-72, 406 A.2d at 150-51.
171. See text accompanying notes 140-42 supra.
172. As to a particular risk of harm, if its existence was unknowable, it is irrelevant
whether there was in existence scientifically possible means to obviate it. For example, even
if a 15 cent fail-safe widget could have been used on a product to prevent a risk that was
unknown at the time the product was designed, the manufacturer would not have known of
the need to employ it. Notably the California Supreme Court in Barker declined to reach the
issue of whether state of the art will be a viable defense under the duel-standard test. 20 Cal.
3d at 430 n.10, 573 P.2d at 455 n.10, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.10.
173. Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 589 P.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1978); Wilson




ble.74 Thus, before it ever reaches the issue of whether the manu-
facturer's conduct was reasonable, a court would first have to con-
sider whether an alternative design was not only technologically
possible, but economically practicable. In Wilson v. Piper Aircraft
Corp.,"' the Supreme Court of Oregon addressed the issue of the
plaintiff's burden of proof in establishing a prima facie case of lia-
bility based upon design defect.
Wilson involved wrongful death actions brought on behalf of
passengers killed in the crash of a Piper Cherokee. The accident
was allegedly caused by engine failure resulting from carburetor ic-
ing."' The plaintiffs' contention was that the small aircraft was
dangerously defective because it was designed with a carbureted
rather than a fuel-injected engine.1 7 Evidence offered at trial estab-
lished that carbureted engines are characteristically more suscepti-
ble to icing than fuel-injected engines and that at the time the air-
plane was manufactured, fuel-injected engines were available and
probably could have been obtained. 17 The jury returned substan-
tial verdicts for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the defendant claimed
that the evidence submitted by plaintiffs was insufficient to take
the case to the jury. The Supreme Court of Oregon agreed. Al-
lowing that the plaintiffs did come forward with sufficient evidence
to convince the trier of fact that an alternative and safer design
was feasible, the court held that this was not enough to establish a
prima facie case of design defect.1 71 When a product involves com-
plicated design features that are outside the common knowledge of
the lay person, the plaintiff "must show more than the technical
possibility of a safer design." ' The plaintiff offered no evidence on
the effect that substituting a fuel-injected engine would have on
the "cost, economy of operation, maintenance requirements, over-
all performance, or safety in respects other than susceptibility to
icing.""'1
In a petition for rehearing, plaintiffs called the court's atten-
tion to that portion of the Barker case holding that a plaintiff need
only establish that the design of the defendant's product proxi-
174. See 141 South Main, Inc. v. Magic Fingers, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 724, 728, 364
N.E.2d 605, 608 (1977) (the court questioned whether feasibility was an essential element of
plaintiff's prima facie case).
175. 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322, rehearing denied, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 128 (1978).
176. Id. at 63, 577 P.2d at 1324.
177. Id. at 63-64, 577 P.2d at 1324. Plaintiff also alleged that the aircraft was defective
because the rear passenger compartment was not crashworthy. Id. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1327.
178. Id. at 70, 577 P.2d at 1327.
179. Id. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1326.
180. Id. at 68, 577 P.2d at 1326.
181. Id. at 70, 577 P.2d at 1327.
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mately caused his injury. The court expressly rejected this ap-
proach, affirming that its original opinion was correct under the
prudent manufacturer standard, the accepted test for product de-
fect in the state."8 2 Thus, in Oregon, a plaintiff may not make out a
prima facie case on a simple showing that a safer alternative was
technologically feasible. The plaintiff's burden of establishing that
a product's design is defective includes the requirement that the
plaintiff come forward with evidence to prove that the proposed al-
ternative design was also "practicable in terms of cost and the
overall design and operation of the product."''
If the manufacturer's liability for design defects is to be cut off
somewhere short of absolute liability, the requirement that plain-
tiffs establish technological and economic practicability in addition
to mere feasibility would appear to offer a sound counterbalancing
element to the reasonably prudent manufacturer test. There still
remain, of course, the problems attendant upon a hindsight impu-
tation to the manufacturer of scienter of danger."' A recent Arizona
case'85 has proposed a bifurcated strict liability/negligence test for
design defect cases that squarely confronts the problem of holding
a manufacturer accountable for knowledge and technology that
may have been unknowable at the time the challenged product was
manufactured. The Arizona court forthrightly recognized that ab-
solute liability could result if scienter of harm was imputed to a
manufacturer and concluded that any proposed balancing test
must therefore be grounded in pure negligence principles.
In Brady v. Melody Homes Manufacturer,'86 a fire of unknown
origin destroyed a mobile home, killing two of the occupants and
severely injuring a third. Plaintiffs alleged that the mobile home
was defectively designed because it provided only one egress,'8 7 had
182. 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978). See also note 67 supra.
183. 282 Or. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1327. See also Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97
(5th Cir. 1978)(At trial, plaintiff claimed that an industrial saw was defective because it had
a removable safety guard. Plaintiff claimed the saw should have been designed with a perma-
nently attached guard, which was technologically available at the time the saw was manufac-
tured. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court should have directed a verdict for the
defendant on the issue of defective design. Id. at 101. "The evidence is overwhelming that
permanent attachment of the blade guard assembly would seriously impair the usefulness of
defendant's product. Texas law does not require a manufacturer to destroy the utility of his
product in order to make it safe." Id.).
184. See text accompanying notes 140-42 supra and text accompanying note 194 infra.
185. Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 121 Ariz. 253, 589 P.2d 896 (Ct. App. 1978).
186. Id.
187. In a motion for rehearing, Melody Homes pointed out that the court was mistaken
as to the existence of only one door; in fact, the mobile home had two doors. The court held
to its original analysis, however, since the location of the second door still provided inade-




no escape hatches or pop-out windows, and failed to include smoke
detector alarms.'8 The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. The Arizona Court of Appeals cited with ap-
proval the first prong of the Barker test, under which strict liability
will attach if a product falls below reasonable consumer expecta-
tions.' 9 Nevertheless, as to the very many design cases in which a
consumer would not know what to expect in the way of design
safety, strict liability will not apply.8 0 The court rejected the sec-
ond prong of Barker'9' for cases of this type, finding unconvincing
the logic of the instruction to focus on the product rather than on
the conduct of the manufacturer. The Arizona court reasoned that
if liability is to be imposed on the basis of defining defect through a
risk-utility analysis, which necessarily involves questions of feasi-
bility, "then the court has moved out of the area of strict liability
and into the area of reasonableness of the manufacturer's con-
duct."'9 2 When a court cannot say as a matter of law that a product
or design was dangerous beyond the reasonable contemplation of
the ordinary consumer, the second tier of the Arizona test comes
into play. Under this approach, the trier of fact openly applies the
standard principles of a negligence calculus.
1 3
The court expressly rejected the reasonably prudent manufac-
turer test because of its imputation of scienter of harm to the man-
ufacturer. The court explained that to hold a manufacturer ac-
countable for data that was technologically unknowable at the time
of manufacture was essentially to move beyond tort law into a
compensation system.'94 Thus, following the Arizona Supreme
Court decision in Byrns v. Riddell, Inc.,' which held that the un-
reasonably dangerous element of product defect was to be defined
in terms of a risk-utility analysis, the court in Brady held that this
balancing inquiry must be grounded in negligence principles: the
trier of fact is to determine if the manufacturer's conduct was rea-
sonable in adopting the design utilized.'98 Simply because a better
mousetrap could be built does not mean that liability inexorably
follows. "Liability only follows where a showing is made that the
188. Id. at 256, 589 P.2d at 899.
189. See text accompanying notes 46-50 supra.
190. 121 Ariz. at 259-60, 589 P.2d at 902-03.
191. See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
192. 121 Ariz. at 259, 589 P.2d at 902.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976).
196. 121 Ariz. at 259, 589 P.2d at 902.
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manufacturer was negligent in not adopting the better mousetrap
design.""'
V. "PURE" RISK-UTiLiTY TEST
Demanding that a risk-utility analysis (whether conceived in
negligence or strict liability) be funnelled through the perspective of
either the ordinary consumer" 8 or the reasonably prudent manufac-
turer"' can raise difficult conceptual problems for the trier of fact.
This has led some courts to adopt what is thought to be a less spec-
ulative and analytically more direct approach. Rather than set a
hypothetical standard or point of view for the analysis, the trier of
fact is asked to balance the risk of harm against the utility or social
benefit of the product and determine which is greater. No point of
view is imposed on the balancing inquiry. This conclusion was
reached recently by the Texas Supreme Court in Turner v. General
Motors Corp.w
3
In Turner the plaintiff brought an action in strict liability
against the manufacturer of a car, alleging that the vehicle was un-
crashworthy.0'1 The trial court submitted the case to the jury under
a consumer expectations test drafted in the "unreasonably danger-
ous" language of comment i. A verdict for plaintiff was reversed on
appeal. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals distinguished cases in-
197. Id. The Brady approach to determining manufacturer liability for defectively de-
signed products preserves state of the art as a viable defense. An affidavit submitted in
support of the defendant's motion for summary judgment claimed "'that smoke detector
devices. . . were not known to, or available for, use of the mobile home construction industry
in the United States in 1964.' "Id. at 255, 589 P.2d at 898. Plaintiff's affidavit opposing the
motion "stated that photoelectric smoke detectors were the subject of standards adopted by
the American National Standards Institute in July, 1962." Id. The court found as a matter
of law that a reasonable consumer in 1964 would not have contemplated the installation of
smoke detector alarms. "This omission, in our opinion, does not fall within the definition of
'defect' for strict liability purposes, and therefore must be judged upon negligence princi-
ples-the standard being that of a reasonably prudent manufacturer. In this context
[defendant's] 'state of the art' defense is viable." Id. at 260, 589 P.2d at 903. The court went
on to indicate:
We note that the legislature has added Article 9, entitled "Product Liability" to Title
12, chapter 6 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, effective for causes of action accruing on
or after September 3, 1978. Under A.R.S. § 12-683 of that new section, "state of the art"
is considered a defense in all products liability cases, including those to be determined
under principles of strict liability. Under our analysis, in design defect cases, "state of
the art," that is, "feasibility" of design, is only pertinent in a negligence context. What
effect, if any, the statute has, we do not reach.
Id. at 260 n.4, 589 P.2d at 903 n.4.
198. See text accompanying notes 104-16 supra.
199. See text accompanying notes 119-23 supra.
200. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
201. Id. at 846. An earlier decision in Turner established that a manufacturer may be
strictly liable for second-collision injuries. 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1974).
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volving a conscious design defect that causes both an accident and
resulting injuries, from crashworthiness cases involving a conscious
design defect that causes injury only, and held that in the latter,
the jury is to be instructed to balance specific risk-utility factors in
determining whether the vehicle's design was unreasonably danger-
ous. 202 In reviewing this decision, the Texas Supreme Court deter-
mined, as an initial matter, that a crashworthiness case is subject
to the same rules of strict liability as any other design defect
case.203 Prior holdings of the court0 4 had submitted such issues to
the jury under the following bifurcated test:
[T]he product is unreasonably dangerous (1) if the product threatens
harm to persons using the automobile to the extent that any automobile
so designed would not be placed in the channels of commerce by a pru-
dent manufacturer aware of the risk involved in its use or (2) to the
extent that the automobile would not meet the reasonable expectations
of the ordinary consumer as to its safety.216
The Texas Supreme Court took the opportunity in Turner to
reexamine the efficacy of this alternative buyer-seller test2" and the
202. General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1978).
The Court of Civil Appeals held that the following factors should be balanced:
(1) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole weighed against
the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use; (2) the availability of a substitute
product which would meet the same need and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive;
(3) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without
seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its costs; (4) the user's
anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability
because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the
existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
Id. at 818.
203. 584 S.W.2d at 847-48.
204. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Henderson v.
Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974).
205. 584 S.W.2d at 850.
206. This test appears to have been adopted initially in Welch v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973), in which the court stated:
We see no necessary inconsistency between a seller-oriented standard and a user-
oriented standard when, as here, each turns on foreseeable risks. They are two sides of
the same standard. A product is defective and unreasonably dangerous when a reasona-
ble seller would not sell the product if he knew of the risks involved or if the risks are
greater than a reasonable buyer would expect.
Accord, Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037-38 (1974); note
122 supra.
The dissent in Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 101 (Tex. 1974)(Johnson,
J., dissenting), challenged the soundness of the reasoning behind the alternative buyer-seller
test:
It is entirely possible that the proof of the consumer will fully establish that the product
would not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary user, while the proof of the
manufacturer will equally establish that a prudent manufacturer might market the
product notwithstanding the risks involved in its use. In such a case, will there be
recovery since one element of the majority's bifurcated test has been met, or will recovery
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enumerated factors, risk-utility test applied by the intermediate
appellate court. The court rejected the validity of the bifurcated
test because of "the inconclusiveness of the idea that jurors would
know what ordinary consumers would expect in the consumption or
use of a product, or that jurors would or could apply any standard
or test outside that of their own experiences and expectations."2,
Secondly, it rejected the enumerated factors, risk-utility test be-
cause of the "difficulty of formulating a series of specific factors
which fact finders will be instructed to balance."2 8 The court drew
support for this conclusion by noting that different commentators
propose different sets of factors to be weighed in design defect
cases.20' The court held that although evidence may be introduced
at trial that goes to the issue of ordinary consumer expectations
and that raises various factors to be balanced in a risk-utility anal-
ysis, the jury may not be instructed in these terms. The court sug-
gested the following model instruction in which the jury is asked in
very general terms to weigh the risks involved in using the product
against the product's utility:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time
[product] in question was manufactured by [the manufacturer] the
[product] was defectively designed?
By the term "defectively designed" as used in this issue is meant a
product that is unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consid-
eration the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use. 1'
While the proposed instruction is certainly to be commended
for its economy of language, it does raise some serious questions in
terms of practical application. By refusing to allow an instruction
be defeated since the other element ... has been negated?
This problem of potential inconsistency, which is implicit in the alternative buyer-seller test,
becomes particularly acute in cases involving products that are designed with open and
obvious dangers. For example, in Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods Co., 576 P.2d 725 (Mont. 1978),
plaintiff was injured when his left arm slipped into the unshielded intake end of a grain auger.
The jury was instructed under an alternative buyer-seller test. The Supreme Court of Mon-
tana held this was reversible error. Looking to the consumer-oriented part of the test, the
court noted that the trier of fact could find that the grain auger was not unreasonably
dangerous because it was not, in the words of the jury instruction, " 'dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer. . ."' Id. at 729. At
the same time, and quite inconsistently, a jury could also find, under the second part of the
test, that the grain auger was indeed unreasonably dangerous because a manufacturer, as-
suming he knew of the dangerous condition of the auger, would have been" 'acting unreason-
ably in placing it on the market.' ' Id. Thus, concluded the Montana Supreme Court, "[tihis
instruction could only have confused the jury as to what is meant by the term 'unreasonably
dangerous,' and it was improper." Id. at 730.
207. 584 S.W.2d at 851.
208. Id. at 849.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 847 n.1.
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that specifically directs a jury to consider certain particular factors
in weighing the evidence offered at trial, the court fundamentally
leaves the trier of fact to rely on some visceral sense of whether the
product was riskier than it was useful. Thus, as the concurring
opinion in Turner noted,
[Sluch instruction by implied exclusion limits the jury's evidentiary
considerations solely to utility and risk and by reason of the clause "Do
you find from a preponderance of the evidence" the jury will usually
decide the case on whether utility outweighs the risk. Though a product
bears a danger that could be removed for a few pennies its use would
generally outweigh the risk."'
Under the Turner instruction, the trier of fact might just as
likely find the opposite, that is, that the risli outweighs the utility.
In cases involving products with which the jury has little experi-
ence, the presence of a seriously injured plaintiff in the courtroom
might well lead to a sympathetic conclusion that the product is
simply too risky (even though the manufacturer may have ade-
quately warned of the danger and designed into the product every
safety feature technologically possible).
In Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,212 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court also had occasion recently to define the nature of a
risk-utility analysis that employs neither a consumer nor a manu-
facturer point of view. The case involved a plaintiff who was in-
jured while operating a lawn mower. Contrary to the product's
written instructions to mow slopes horizontally, the plaintiff
mowed up and down a steep slope, lost his balance, and slipped. As
he fell, the plaintiffs foot somehow got under the housing13 and
came in contact with the mower's blade. There was no rear trailing
guard on the equipment. Conflicting evidence was offered at trial
as to whether the absence of the guard was causally related to the
plaintiff's injury.
21'
The New Hampshire court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of
the defendant. The court, in reaching its decision, rejected the oft-
repeated theory that strict liability is but a tool of social engineer-
ing, whereby manufacturers are required to bear the risk and loss
caused by products. The court emphatically noted that
211. Id. at 854 (Campbell, J., concurring)(emphasis in original).
212. 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
213. The plaintiff advanced the theory that his foot slipped under the housing because
there was no trailing guard; the defendant claimed that the plaintiff lifted the mower when
he fell and brought the blade down onto his foot, in which case a rear trailing guard would
not have prevented the injury. 118 N.H. at 805-06, 395 A.2d at 845.
214. Id.
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[u]nlike workmen's compensation and no-fault automobile insurance,
strict liability is not a no-fault system of compensation. The common-
law principle that fault and responsibility are elements of our legal sys-
tem applicable to corporations and individuals alike will not be under-
mined or abolished by 'spreading' of risk and cost in this State. 15
Thus, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the trier of
fact, in balancing risk against utility, must consider whether the
manufacturer could have reduced the risk without significant im-
pact on the product's utility and cost of manufacture. " 6 This ap-
proach would not preclude imposing liability on the manufacturer
of a product of significant beneficial utility if it were found that the
manufacturer failed to take reasonable steps to eliminate or lessen
the danger.
Some of the factors to be weighed in the risk-utility analysis
emerge from the requirement that the plaintiff prove causation and
foreseeability.217 As the court noted, "[i]nquiry into the dangerous-
ness of a product requires a multifaceted balancing process involv-
ing evaluation of many conflicting factors. . . . Reasonableness,
foreseeability, utility, and similar factors are questions of fact for
jury determination.""21 The New Hampshire Supreme Court in-
sisted that all these balancing factors be advanced to give the trier
of fact a reasoned basis upon which to make a determination. Liti-
gants and the trier of fact under the Thibault approach will not be
left of some purely speculative sense of whether risk outweighs
utility.
The Thibault court revealed a practical concern for the poten-
tially serious economic repercussions of the application of strict lia-
bility on both the consumer and the manufacturer. Since a finding
of liability for defective design could result in the removal of a
product from the market, with the consequent diminution of con-
sumer choices, the court reasoned that the "utility of the product
must be evaluated from the point of view of the public as a
whole." '' Further, since the high cost of insurance threatens the
continued existence of many smaller manufacturers, with resultant
economic concentration, courts must look closely at the steps the
215. Id. at 806, 395 A.2d at 845-46.
216. Id. at 807, 395 A.2d at 846.
217. Id. at 809, 395 A.2d at 847.
218. Id. at 809, 395 A.2d at 847-48.
219. Id. at 807, 395 A.2d at 846. Contra, UPLA, supra note 102, Analysis § 104(B), 44
Fed. Reg. at 62,723:
[Ilt is important to consider evidence relating to the effect of the alternative design on
the usefulness of the product. . . . It is important to note that this evidence is not
directed to the general usefulness of the product in society, i.e., the overall social worth
of pharmaceuticals, lawnmowers, or other products.
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manufacturer has or has not taken to lessen risks before imposing
liability. 220
VI. THE COURT-AS-POLICYMAKER APPROACH
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has forged a novel solution
to the question of formulating a legal definition of "defective condi-
tion unreasonably dangerous." In fact, were it not so unacceptable
and "unprincipled,"2 ' the decision in Azzarello v. Black Brothers
Co. ,22 would quickly force dismissal of many of the problems raised
in this discussion. The facts of the case are familiar and straight-
forward: the plaintiff's hand was pinched between two hard rubber
rollers in a coating machine manufactured and sold by the defen-
dant. Plaintiff, alleging defective design, brought suit against the
manufacturer solely on the theory of strict products liability. 22 The
trial court repeatedly instructed the jury using the term "unreason-
ably dangerous." Relying on the earlier Pennsylvania case of
Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,22 the plaintiff appealed
from a defendant's verdict, claiming that the instruction requiring
proof of unreasonable danger constituted reversible error. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed.26 The decision in Azzarello
not only eliminated the term "unreasonably dangerous," but it of-
fered a radical shift in the allocation of the appropriate roles for
judge and jury in a cause of action based on strict liability.
At the outset, the court emphasized that the term "unreasona-
bly dangerous" as set forth in section 402A has no special meaning
of its own; rather, it is a mere "label to be used where it is deter-
mined that the risk of loss should be placed upon the supplier."
22
The issue of whether the utility of a product outweighs the danger
is essentially a question of social policy: Should the loss be shifted
from injured plaintiff to the defendant? Thus, according to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a risk-utility analysis is not within
the province of the trier of fact; it is a question of law for the court,
grounded in social policy. 7 "It is a judicial function to decide
whether, under plaintiff's averment of the facts, recovery would be
justified; only after this judicial determination is made is the cause
220. 118 N.H. at 806-07, 395 A.2d at 845-46.
221. See Professor Henderson's analysis in Products Liability, 2 CORP. L. REV. 246
(1979).
222. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
223. Id. at 549-50, 391 A.2d at 1022.
224. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
225. 480 Pa. at 551-52, 391 A.2d at 1023.
226. Id. at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025.
227. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
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submitted to the jury to determine whether the facts of the case
support the averments of the complaint."228 The court suggested
the following charge to the jury:
The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The product
must, therefore, be provided with every element necessary to make it
safe for [its intended] use, and without any condition that makes it un-
safe for [its intended] use. If you find that the product, at the time it
left the defendant's control, lacked any element necessary to make it
safe for [its intended] use or contained any condition that made it un-
safe for [its intended] use, then the product was defective, and the de-
fendant is liable for all harm caused by such defect.2
Is there any product that cannot be made safer in some way? This
instruction calls forth fantastic cartoon images of products, both
simple and complex, laden with fail-safe mechanism atop fail-safe
mechanism. As Professor Henderson observed:
Taken literally, the test is absurd and unworkable. No sensible person
would insist that a product designer must include every precaution,
however costly. At bottom, the design alternatives to which plaintiffs
point in these cases must be shown somehow to have been feasible, or
sensible, regardless of whether one speaks in terms of "unreasonably
dangerous." For the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to suggest otherwise
is nonsensical.2"
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the decision is the funda-
mental disdain the court manifests for the adjudicative process.
Strict products liability is not the first legal doctrine to emerge out
of social and economic policy considerations. Traditionally, how-
ever, our system of law leaves it to the good judgment of juries to
effectuate the policies underlying legal doctrines. Although some
commentators21 have questioned whether the judicial system is
228. Id.
229. Id. at 559-60 n.12, 391 A.2d at 1027 n.12.
230. Henderson, supra note 221, at 248.
231. Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: To-
ward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. Rav. 773, 779-80 (1979):
The adjudicatory process is inadequate as a method of resolving, on a case-by-case basis,
the vague question of whether or not risks presented by a particular product are unrea-
sonable. When forced to make such decisions, courts must resolve complex and often
times highly technical issues of design alternatives equipped only with legal principle
reduced to its most basic degree of generalization: a balancing test. In effect, the courts
are forced to second-guess the designers, they are forced to redesign the product them-
selves. The result is to push the adjudicatory process to the brink of arbitrariness. Unless
more specific middle ground rules of decision, consistent with the underlying cost-
benefit principles, are developed, foreseeability, consistency, and other qualities of prin-
cipled decisionmaking will continue to be lacking and the integrity of the judicial system
will continue to be threatened.
See also Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 79-80, 268 N.W.2d 291, 294 (1978)
(the court relied on Professor Henderson's commentary in concluding that "adjudication
must necessarily play a limited role in setting design standards."); Henderson, Judicial
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competent in conscious design defect cases either to establish prod-
uct safety standards or to reexamine safety standards set by indus-
try or government, most commentators232 and the courts33 adhere
to the view that a properly instructed jury can adequately and
responsibly perform the necessary balancing test required by a risk-
utility approach. The argument that the trier of fact is incapable of
reasonably and justly resolving conscious design issues is of dubi-
ous merit. Juries are frequently called upon to consider complex
evidentiary data in many different areas of litigation. Moreover, as
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he problems
presented in products liability jury trials would appear no more in-
surmountable than similar problems in other areas of the law.
23' 4
It is the function and responsibility of the skillful lawyer to explain
and present even the most technical information in a manner com-
prehensible to the lay juror. A basic premise of our common-law
system is that if lawyers perform their function properly, jurors will
be able to fulfill their fact-finding responsibility, thereby arriving
at a just accommodation of the rights and interests of adverse
parties.
This writer's confidence in the fundamental capability of ju-
rors fairly to arbitrate design defect issues235 should not be viewed
as a suggestion that all claims based on defective design be sent to
the jury. Trial judges must, as an initial matter, perform their
Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM.
L. REv. 1531 (1973).
232. See, e.g., Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings
in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigations Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 539
(1976):
The structure suggested by Professor Henderson to limit judicial participation in the
process by requiring courts to take a hands-off position regarding all decisions that are
the result of conscious design choice, be they private or governmental, would deny the
courts entry into the reexamination of standard setting. . . .[W]e believe that Profes-
sor Henderson's argument goes well beyond a call for tighter judicial control of design
defect cases. It is a call to the courts to tread with trepidation when dealing with
corporate or governmental decision-making in the context of a private design defect
lawsuit. We believe that there exist at present no satisfactory alternatives to the tradi-
tional lawsuit.
233. See, e.g., Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Self
v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974); Arbet v. Gussarson,
66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975).
234. Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 561-62, 225 N.W.2d 431, 438 (1975).
235. As one court noted:
Our faith in the jury system is considerable. We have seen as many defendant's verdicts
as plaintiff's verdicts in products liability cases over the past several years, buttressing
our conclusion that juries are as impartial as they are intelligent. In view of their broad
community base they seem to us well-equipped to perform the factfinding and judgmen-
tal tasks involved.
Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 245-46 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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screening functions with meticulous concern. The fact that jurors
have the intellectual capacity to evaluate the issues involved
should not diminish in any way the essential role that the trial
judge must play in determining if the plaintiff has, in the first in-
stance, stated a cause of action. Especially in cases where plaintiff
attacks technologically sophisticated designs, the trial judge must
be scrupulously careful in determining whether plaintiff has intro-
duced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. Moreover,
when the plaintiff fails to carry this burden, trial courts should not
be reluctant to direct verdicts in favor of the defendant.
At first blush, the screening function assigned the court in Az-
zarello appears to be a prudent effort to assure that only meritori-
ous claims of defective design reach the jury. This, however, is not
the case. The risk-utility balancing process never gets into the
hands of the jury at all, regardless of whether the plaintiff alleges
sufficient evidence to state a cause of action. The balancing test is
exclusively within the province of the court. The implication is
that only trial judges have the special wisdom required to deter-
mine whether a product's design is unreasonably dangerous in the
sense that its risk of harm outweighs its utility. The only function
left for the jury under Azzarello is to determine whether the prod-
uct left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary for its
intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the
intended use.?3 Thus, the question of reasonableness may not be
considered by the jury even in a closely contested case.
VII. THE MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LiABiLrrY ACT APPROACH
The Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA) was recently pub-
lished by the Department of Commerce for voluntary use by the
states.27 The UPLA had its genesis in the Final Report of the Fed-
eral Interagency Task Force on Product Liability, which concluded
that one of the primary causes of the product liability problem was
the "uncertainties in the tort-litigation" system.28 The basic phi-
losophy underlying the UPLA is to shift the cost of accidents from
an injured claimant to a defendant product seller "when there is a
logical and articulated rationale for deeming [the latter]. . . 're-
sponsible' for the claimant's injuries."21 The UPLA clearly eschews
a no-fault (absolute liability) compensation system and adopts
236. 480 Pa. 547, 559, 391 A.2d 1020, 1027.
237. UPLA, supra note 102, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 62,715.
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rules of liability based on a notion of fault or blameworthiness. 40
Nowhere is this philosophy more clearly reflected than in the provi-
sion of the UPLA relating to design defect.
The UPLA initially provides that a manufacturer will be sub-
ject to liability if an injured claimant "proves by a preponderance
of the evidence that the claimant's harm was proximately caused
because the product was defective." ' This section notes that a
product may be proved to be defective if, and only if, it was "un-
reasonably unsafe." ' In order to ascertain if the product was un-
reasonably unsafe in design, the trier of fact is instructed in terms
of a formula based on pure negligence/risk-utility balancing of fac-
tors. The trier of fact is specifically told to balance "(1) the likeli-
hood that the product would cause the claimant's harm or similar
harms, and the seriousness of those harms; against (2) the manu-
facturer's burden of designing a product that would have prevented
those harms, and the adverse effect that alternative design would
have on the usefulness of the product." '
The requirement that the trier of fact evaluate these factors as
of the time of manufacture, not the time of trial, is of particular
significance.2" The UPLA thus rejects the Wade-Keeton hindsight
test in favor of an approach characterized by reasonable anticipa-
tion of risks of harm.us To reinforce this approach, section 104 (Ba-
sic Standards of Responsibility for Manufacturers) expressly re-
quires that "[b]efore submitting the case to the trier of fact, the
court shall determine that the claimant has introduced sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable person to find" that the relevant
product was unreasonably unsafe in designY6 The Analysis empha-
240. In setting forth the criteria of the Act, the drafters of the UPLA make clear that:
Product liability law is a branch of the law of torts. . . .Tort law is not a compensation
system similar to Social Security or Worker Compensation. A product seller should not,
through the medium of tort law, be asked to pay merely because its product caused an
injury. If a social judgment is made that product sellers are to bear the costs of all
injuries caused by their products, it would be far more efficient to make purchasers of
products third-party beneficiaries of product sellers' insurance policies as is the case with
other compensation systems. Such systems also utilize cost-saving devices such as limit-
ing recovery for lost earnings, eliminating recovery for pain and suffering, and abolishing
the collateral source rule. In contrast, product liability law, with its full tort law recov-
ery, reflects the social judgment that liability should be imposed only when it is fair to
hold the individual product seller responsible for an injury.
Id. at 62,715.
241. UPLA, supra note 102, § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
242. Id.
243. Id., Analysis § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723.
244. Id., § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
245. See id. Analysis § 104(C), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724.
246. Id., § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721.
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sizes the importance of this allocation of threshold responsibility to
the court by noting that "[t]he dangers of the trier of fact introduc-
ing hindsight into the risk-utility analysis make it imperative for
the court to apply its screening function carefully." ''4 If the court
determines that the claimant has introduced sufficient evidence to
allow a reasonable person to find, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the product was unreasonably unsafe in design, the
balancing formula is then given to the jury in the form of an in-
struction specifying that the claimant has the burden of establish-
ing that the product was unreasonably unsafe in design.28 The
Analysis points out that it is essential that the traditional principle
of tort law, that the plaintiff sustain the burden of proof, be re-
tained in defective design cases since the claimant, if he recovers,
would be indicting the manufacturer's entire product line. 21
The UPLA points to several examples of especially probative
evidence that the jury may consider in making its evaluation:
(a) Any warnings and instructions provided with the product; (b) The
technological and practical feasibility of a product designed and manu-
factured so as to have prevented claimant's harm while substantially
serving the likely user's expected needs; (c) The effect of any proposed
alternative design on the usefulness of the product; (d) The compara-
tive costs of producing, distributing, selling, using, and maintaining the
product as designed and as alternatively designed; and (e) The new or
additional harms that might have resulted if the product had been so
alternatively designed.2"
Several observations may be made concerning those elements
that the jury may consider and those elements that the UPLA ex-
pressly excluded from the jury's consideration, either in its formu-
lae or detailed list of the more important evidentiary materials.
First, in determining the manufacturer's burden of designing a
product that would have prevented the claimant's injuries and the
adverse effect the alternative design would have on the usefulness
of the product, the jury may consider evidence that it was techno-
logically and practically feasible to design the product in a way
that would substantially serve the expected user's needs and at the
same time have prevented the claimant's harm. If such an alterna-
tive design was available at a slight increase in cost, and if it would
have prevented the claimant's harm, the jury is likely to find that
the product's design was unreasonably unsafe.21 Second, in consid-
247. Id., Analysis § 104(B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 62,724.
250. Id. at 62,721.
251. Id. at 62,723.
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ering the effect that any alternative design would have on the use-
fulness of the product, the evidence should not be directed to the
general usefulness of the product in society, but should focus on the
usefulness of the product to specific users. 21 Third, a manufacturer
may introduce evidence pointing out that new or additional harms
would have arisen had the product been alternatively designed.2s3
The Analysis to Section 104(B) specifically calls attention to
the absence of any of the elements of a consumer expectations test
for reasons of "economics and practicality."" 4 Citing Dean Wade's
observation that in many design matters "the consumer would not
know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the
product could be made," the UPLA grounds its rejection of the
consumer expectations test on the rationale that it "takes subjec-
tivity to its most extreme end. Each trier of fact is likely to have a
different understanding of abstract consumer expectations. More-
over, most consumers are not familiar with the details of the manu-
facturing process and cannot abstractly evaluate conscious design
alternatives. '" =
The approach taken by the drafters of the UPLA would resolve
some of the critical problems that have emerged in products liabil-
ity litigation over the last decade. The verbal formulae adopted by
various courts in defining a strict liability approach in design de-
fect cases are specifically rejected in favor of a fault standard." ' In
support of a standard grounded on the notion of blameworthiness,
the UPLA drafters point out that the risk distribution justification
for the application of strict liability breaks down in practice.s?
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 62,724.
255. Id.
256. It is instructive in this regard to note the justification offered by the drafters for
retaining strict liability in the areas of defects in construction and breach of express warranty:
The "Task Force Report" concluded that strict liability for defective construction can
be absorbed within the existing liability insurance system. There is a degree of predicta-
bility with regard to these defective products that is not found with respect to products
that are defective in design or to failure to warn. Strict liability for defective construction
has also been predicated on Section 402A of the "Restatement" and implied warranty
claims under commercial law. These sources support the position that consumers have
the right to expect that products are free from construction defects.
Strict liability cases involving breach of an express warranty can also be justified.
If a manufacturer makes a specific representation about its product, it is fair to hold
the manufacturer to that promise. Moreover, the consumer has the right to expect that
a product will live up to the manufacturer's representations.
Id. at 62,722.
257. The Drafters note that:
While courts that have applied strict liability in design and duty-to-warn cases have
often stated that they are not imposing "absolute" insurer liability, they have not been
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Moreover, strict liability represents an "overkill" in creating
needed incentives for loss prevention."' The formulae adopted by
the UPLA have the merit of being clear and understandable to a
jury and, if uniformly adopted by the states, could have a stabiliz-
ing effect on products liability law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
During the decade and a half since Greenman and the adop-
tion of section 402A of the Restatement, courts have struggled to
rework the basic standards for imposing liability in design defect
cases. As the many recent decisions discussed in this Article
demonstrate, a consistent, uniform, and just approach to defining
the term "defect" has not yet been achieved. Courts have tena-
ciously repeated the original rationales underlying a theory of strict
products liability without inquiring into the continued viability of
these notions. Manufacturers, for example, are thought to be in the
best position to distribute the costs of product-related injuries by
purchasing insurance or increasing prices of their products. They
are also deemed to be in the best position to control the risk of
injuries through safety-conscious design, testing, and inspection
programs. Thus, a theory of strict liability, which assures compen-
sation to those injured by defective products, is said to provide the
needed economic incentive for manufacturers to design safer
products.
The time has come to ask candidly whether some courts, in
their eagerness to provide recovery for injured plaintiffs, have not
overzealously emphasized and relied upon the risk-spreading ratio-
nale of strict products liability with a resultant abandonment of
any serious consideration of the reasonableness of the manufac-
turer's conduct, which is the very essence of a system of tort recov-
ery. If courts are going to apply strict liability as a purely compen-
satory device, then they should be forthright in identifying it as
such instead of covertly providing recovery under the rubric of a
risk-spreading rationale. Even more importantly, if as a social mat-
ter one deems it desirable to hold manufacturers absolutely liable
for all product-related injuries, then a legislative approach to the
able to articulate why they draw a line short of that partitular point. The reason for this
is that the risk distribution rationale provides no stopping point short of absolute liabil-
ity. Thus, a number of courts have plunged into a foggy area that is neither true strict
liability nor negligence. The result has been the creation of a wide variety of legal
"formulae," unpredictability for consumers, and instability in the insurance market.
258. Id.
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problem is required so that limits can be reasonably placed upon
recovery.
Without a statutory limitation on recoverable damages, a risk-
spreading rationale that approaches absolute liability is no longer
tenable because of the considerable increase in the number of prod-
ucts liability cases as well as the substantial increase in the size of
jury verdicts and settlements.2ss Both of these factors have created
a serious insurance problem26 for many manufacturers because of
the "unaffordability" and, in a few cases, unavailability of cover-
age.211 Insurance carriers, who have substantially raised product li-
ability premiums,262 claim that these increases are due, at least in
part, to uncertainties created by the courts in the tort litigation
system. Many underwriters "feel they have no way of knowing
what the future holds in terms of new theories of liability, eroding
259. See Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Response to the Product Liability
Crisis, 14 FORUM 251 (1978).
260. U.S. DmP"T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABIUTY, FINAL
REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY, (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT-INSURANCE];
Product Liability Insurance, A Report of the Subcommittee on Capital, Investment and
Business Opportunities of the Committee of Small Businesses, H.R. Rep. No.95-997, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8-11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Report].
261. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, BRIEFING
REPORT-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY II (1977). The findings of one Congressional panel are illus-
trative. Of 180 manufacturing companies that responded to a questionnaire about product
liability insurance, 15% said they did not need such insurance and therefore did not carry
any.
Of the remaining 153 companies, 33 said they wanted to buy product liability insurance
but either could not afford it or could not find a carrier who would sell it to them. Thus
21.6 percent of those in our sample who sought product liability insurance could not
obtain it. Fully 60 companies said they had been forced to increase the price they
charged on at least one product line because of rising insurance cost. Hence, consumer
prices are directly affected by product liability in one out of every three companies in
our study. A total of 31 companies, out of 60, told us they had been forced to abandon
at least one product in their line because of rising costs or problems.
We had 54 companies that provided us with data on their product liability insurance
premiums in the last 6 years. The-average increase from 1970 to date was an incredible
944.6 percent.
Product Liability Insurance, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Capital, Investment and
Business Opportunities of the Committee on Small Businesses, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Hearings].
262. See, e.g., the testimony of the National Machine Tool Builders' Association before
the House Subcommittee on Capital, Investment and Business Opportunities: "The average
machine tool builder has seen his product liability insurance costs rise from $10,000 in 1970
to $40,000 in 1975 to $71,000 in 1976 and then almost double again to $132,100 this year
[1977]." Subcommittee Hearings at 287. The data collected from the metal cutting machi-
nery builders was even more dramatic: The premiums jumped from an average of $1,900 in
1970 to $126,800 in 1977 (an increase of 6,673 percent). Id. at 291. While it is certainly true
that not all industries have experienced such extravagant increases in product liability insur-
ance premiums, it is nevertheless clear that in many instances premium increases have
exceeded 200% and that increases of more than 1,000% over the last eight years are not
uncommon. Subcommittee Report at 70.
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validity of traditional defenses, or escalating concepts of appropri-
ate compensation for loss or injury." '63
One must also question whether strict liability in design cases
is any more efficacious than a negligence standard in providing an
incentive to manufacturers to design safer products. With fifteen
years of costly litigation experience and continually soaring insur-
ance rates behind them, manufacturers can forcefully argue that
greater incentive might be supplied by a tort, or fault, approach.
At least in negligence, when issues of reasonableness and due care
are central to the inquiry, the conscientious manufacturer can take
heart that the effort and expense he devotes to product safety will
make a difference. He can rely on a court of law distinguishing be-
tween the safety-conscious and vigilant manufacturer on the one
hand, and the lax and careless one on the other. The negligence
approach would also add some much-needed stability and predict-
ability to the tort litigation system, which would doubtless have a
reciprocal calming effect on insurers. The primary goal underlying
any standard of liability for product-related injuries resulting from
defective design should be, not compensation, but the reduction of
the incidence of injuries. As a matter of rational social policy, it is
of foremost importance to build into the rule of law an approach
aimed at deterring conduct that exposes consumers and users to
unreasonable risks of harm. Presumably, if courts and juries were
to take cognizance of a manufacturer's efforts at designing a safe
product, underwriters would feel confident in formulating insur-
ance rates based on considered judgments of the real risks involved
vis-a-vis the specific safety-oriented conduct of the individual man-
ufacturer."' In addition, the conscientious manufacturer and the
consumer would no longer have to pick up the tab for the careless
or negligent manufacturer. Broadly spreading the risk of product-
related injuries, without more, meets only a secondary goal of com-
pensating injured plaintiffs. Only by fusing the rule of law gov-
erning design cases to a notion of faulty conduct will the rationale
of providing manufacturers with a true incentive to design safer
products have any meaning.
One must note that strict liability does seem to work effi-
ciently and fairly in cases of manufacturing defects, doubtless be-
cause the test for defectiveness is built-in and readily ascertainable
by reference to the manufacturer's own production standards as
well as those customarily observed in the industry. Serious analytic
263. FINAL REPORT-INsuRANCE at 4-88.




difficulties arise, however, when strict liability is applied in con-
scious design defect cases, in which the very determination of the
existence of a defect is the central issue to be resolved. The tradi-
tional consumer expectations test is, by and large, hopelessly inad-
equate as a vehicle for discerning a standard for defectiveness in
design cases. When the defect is patent, the test often leaves the
loss on the injured consumer, who may be assumed in law to have
accepted the risk of injury. When the defect is latent and the prod-
uct complicated in design, we cannot say with any certainty that
consumers know what to expect because they usually do not know
how safely the product could or should have been made. If this pro-
position is true, then presumably jurors, who are themselves ordi-
nary consumers, do not know what the plaintiff or the hypothetical
objective consumer expected in the way of safety- How, then, can
jurors charged under a consumer expectations test make a determi-
nation of whether to impose liability? In all probability, they guess.
As the drafters of the UPLA aptly point out, "[e]ach trier of fact is
likely to have a different understanding of abstract consumer ex-
pectations. 126 5 The consumer expectations test is clearly a holdover
from the warranty heritage of strict products liability, wherein the
trier of fact was asked to focus on the buyer's defeated expecta-
tions. This, however, is not a tort way of looking at the problem of
product defect. Indeed, within the tort system, the question should
focus on the manufacturer's conduct (what he did or did not do),
rather than on the consumer's expectations.
In Barker, however, the California Supreme Court made what
seems to be a forceful argument for retaining the consumer expec-
tations analysis, at least as a threshold test for determining prod-
uct defect. While it is certainly true, as the Barker court noted,
that consumer expectations provide a floor or minimum standard
below which no product should fall, it is not clear that this is a
practical or useful test of liability at all. If a product that causes
injury is so clearly defective in design that a plaintiff could make
out a prima facie case on the grounds of consumer expectations
alone, it is extremely unlikely that the case would ever be litigated.
It is unthinkable that in a case involving a clear violation of rea-
sonable consumer expectations a manufacturer would go to the
enormous expense of litigation and at the same time run the haz-
ardous risk of imperiling an entire product line by ever allowing the
issue to go to trial. This is the case that gets settled-quietly.
In a case in which it is not altogether clear whether or not the
265. UPLA, supra note 102, Analysis § 104 (B), 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,724.
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risk of injury exceeds the expectations of the ordinary consumer,
the plaintiff would be foolhardy to rest his case on a comment i
approach. Rather, the plaintiff will almost certainly seek to make
out his case for imposing liability on the manufacturer on the basis
of a risk-utility balancing approach. Practically, it thus seems
quite unnecessary to confuse juries with disjunctive instructions
posing the vague standard of reasonable consumer expectations on
the one hand against the more concrete elucidation of risk-utility
factors on the other.
Many jurisdictions have, in fact, turned away from the con-
sumer expectations approach and apply instead some form of a
risk-utility balancing test for determining defectiveness in design
cases. Nevertheless, in an attempt to define the test in terms that
are uniquely suitable and exclusively applicable to products liabil-
ity cases, courts have taken what is essentially a negligence
calculus and turned it into something else by relying on two funda-
mentally suspect assumptions. First, following Deans Wade and
Keeton, the courts impute scienter of the danger to the manufac-
turer on the ground that it is unfair to burden the injured plaintiff
with the difficult task of proving that the manufacturer was negli-
gent. Second, since the risk-utility analysis is, through the magical
imputation of scienter, no longer deemed a negligence test, the bal-
ancing of factors must necessarily yield a conclusion that focuses
on the nature or condition of the product rather than on the con-
duct of the manufacturer.
2
66
The argument that plaintiffs would be tremendously disadvan-
taged by having to prove negligence on the part of the manufac-
turer was originally posited in connection with early manufacturing
defect cases. Indeed, it is probably true that a plaintiff would find
it enormously difficult and sometimes even impossible to prove the
negligent conduct that led to the soda bottle with the hairline frac-
ture that ultimately exploded and caused plaintiff's injuries. At
some particular moment in time on an otherwise uneventful day, a
worker on the assembly line might have been distracted and care-
less or some slight malfunction in the plant equipment may have
damaged a few bottles that somehow managed to slip through the
quality-control check points undetected. To be sure, manufacturing
defects are an inevitable by-product of mass production, which
may or may not even be attributable to negligence. Because of the
random and unpredictable nature of the occurrence of a manufac-
turing flaw, however, a plaintiff cannot be expected to be able to
266. See note 125 supra.
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pinpoint the negligence, if any, that was involved. Manufacturing
defects are almost always, by definition, accidents, and so in these
cases the goal of deterrence is not as prominent as the need for
compensating the victims of these assemblyline errors.
The design defect case, on the other hand, presents a very dif-
ferent configuration of elements. A design defect is neither random,
nor unpredictable, nor inevitable. It is the result of deliberate and
documentable decisions on the part of the manufacturer. Here the
plaintiff does not struggle to find some fleeting indicia of negligent
conduct; instead, he seeks to impugn an entire product line by con-
demning a manufacturer's judgment, as manifested by his con-
scious choice of available options. Vastly expanded and liberalized
discovery rules enable the plaintiff to prove that the manufac-.
turer's deliberate design decision was an ill-considered one. Plain-
tiffs have ready access to technical data and expert witnesses, mak-
ing the assumption that it is unduly difficult or impossible to prove
the manufacturer's negligence in design cases fallacious. Further-
more, as almost every vigorously litigated design defect case shows,
plaintiffs do in fact come forward with detailed technical evidence
tending to prove that the manufacturer was either aware of the na-
ture and gravity of the risk posed by the challenged product or that
he could have designed the product more safely. Imputed scienter
is thus essentially an unnecessary fiction that does not theoretically
or even pragmatically serve the questionable foundation upon
which it is based. The goal it does serve, however, is that it may
eliminate defenses based upon state of the art and scientific or
technological unknowability. This, of course, raises the spectre of
absolute liability, which no court has as yet openly sanctioned.
The second questionable assumption courts have relied on in
applying strict liability in design defect cases is that since the risk-
utility balancing test will not require proof of negligence, the con-
clusion derived cannot be cast in terms of negligence. Thus, as the
California Supreme Court has insisted, the trier of fact must focus
on the product, not on the manufacturer's conduct. This is nothing
more than semantic artifice. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
competing factors to be weighed under a risk-utility balancing test
invite the trier of fact to consider the alternatives and risks faced
by the manufacturer and to determine whether in light of these he
exercised reasonable care in making the design choices he did. In-
structing a jury that weighing factors concerning conduct and
judgment must yield a conclusion that does not describe conduct
is confusing at best.
With the singular exception of the Pennsylvania Supreme
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Court, it is doubtful that any court in this country would impose
upon a manufacturer the duty of designing an absolutely safe prod-
uct. In fairness, all that one can ask is that the manufacturer exer-
cise due care in designing products that do not involve unreasona-
ble danger to consumers and users. Dean Prosser described this as
a negligence standard;2 17 the risk-utility balancing test is but a de-
tailed version of Judge Learned Hand's negligence calculus."' Call-
ing a theory of liability based on a duty of due care and a standard
of reasonable conduct anything other than negligence is pure soph-
istry. Of course, this would be harmless if the trier of fact had the
jurisprudential acumen of the legal scholar-but courts are sending
lay jurors off to deliberate with nearly incomprehensible instruc-
tions, leaving them to formulate random and unpredictable
judgments.
Liability for conscious design defects is tortious liability, and
the time has come for courts to stop creating obfuscatory tests that
can only confuse jurors and deny litigants a consistently fair and
just result. Imposing a negligence standard for design defect liabil-
ity is in many cases only to define in a coherent fashion what liti-
gants are in fact arguing and what jurors are in essence analyzing.
When this is not the case, it should in all fairness be the case. The
confused and inconsistent body of product liability case law that
has emerged in the last fifteen years seriously undermines the in-
tegrity of the tort system. As a constructive response, it is time for
courts to adopt, unequivocally and forthrightly, a pure negligence/
risk-utility test in design defect cases.
267. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 31, at 145.
268. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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